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Kentucky Planning and Land Use
Control Enabling Legislation: An
Analysis of the 1966 Revision of
K. R. S. Chapter 100
By A. DAN TAR.ocK*
INTRODUCTION
In 1966 the Kentucky General Assembly revised Kentucky
Revised Statutes (hereinafter referred to as KRS) Chapter 100,
creating, for the first time, uniform legislation for land use
planning and controls.' This revision was long overdue since the
previous enabling legislation,2 applicable to different classes of
cities, was a maze of confusing statutory provisions which, at
best, can be described as a haphazard accretion of specific re-
sponses to a series of ad hoc needs. The prior legislation did not
attempt to assess the development problems that the state was
facing, and will face, nor did it permit a wide and effective
variety of local responses to the problems stemming from the in-
creased competition for land. The purpose of this article is to
analyze the new enabling legislation in light of present environ-
mental problems facing the state according to the following
,Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; A.B., Stanford; L.LB.,
Stanford.
1 The new legislation is still not entirely uniform because Jefferson County
was able to secure several special provisions. The most notable is the fiscal
court's power to enact zoning regulations for fifth and sixth class cities. Ky. REv.
STAT. § 100.17(2) (1966) [hereinafter cited as KBS]. The power of the General
Assembly to withdraw the zoning power from these cities was sustained in Fiscal
Court of Jefferson County v. City of Anchorage, 393 S.V.2d 608 (Ky. 1965).
This is a rational method of dealing with defensive incorporations, but there is
no reason why it should not be applied to other metropolitan areas which need
it, such as the Kentucky portion of the Greater Cincinnati Area.
2 For a detailed description of the previous enabling legislation, see LEGis-
LATIVE BESFACH COMMIsSION, PLANNorN AND ZONING IN KENTucEY, RE EARCa
REPORT No. 12 (1962).
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criteria: 3 to what extent does the legislation reflect concepts of
land use planning and control which are responsive to con-
temporary environmental problems, and will the legislation per-
mit lawyers and planners to operate free from uncertainty with
respect to the meaning and scope of its provisions. The new
legislation represents a major improvement over the previous
enabling legislation, for now the provisions apply uniformly, with
few exceptions, to all classes of cities; grants of authority are
spelled out with greater clarity, thus removing many of the doubts
which have impeded the use of land use controls; and the
creation of more functional planning units is encouraged.
To appreciate the variety of problems faced by the state it is
first necessary to outline briefly the population and land use pat-
terns in Kentucky. According to the 1960 census, 44.5 per cent
of Kentucky's population was classified as urban and the re-
maining 55.5 per cent as rural.4 At this time, Kentucky had two
dominant population patterns-a continual shift of residents from
less to more populous areas of the state, and high out-of-state
migration which practically cancelled the growth from natural
population increases. The net gain between 1950 and 1960 was
only 93,000 persons, contrasted with a natural increase of 483,-
000.0 Since 1960, the out-migration trend has been substantially
curtailed. This is due, in part, to the vigorous and successful
campaign to induce industrial expansion and location within the
state.6
According to recent census studies, Kentucky's population is
presently growing about twice as fast as it was ten years ago.7 The
3 The American Society of Planning Officials suggests that the following in-
quiries be made to evaluate planning legislation: (1) consideration of planning
principles; (2) examination of legal nomenclature; (3) evaluation of whether a
workable intergovernmental relationship exists; (4) determination of whether
impact on development is proper and sufficient. Henrickson, State Enabling
Legislation, 1964 PLANNiNc 215, 216.
4 UNTED STATES BUREAU oF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIE
UN=nE STATES 16 (1966).
5 Id. at 12.
6 Kentucky is a major user of industrial revenue bonds to finance new plants.
This type of financing is authorized by KRS §§ 103.200-.280 (1966). See generally
Note, The "Public Purpose" and Municipal Financing for Industrial Development,
70 YALE L. J. 789 (1961). A local development agency may also apply to the
state Industrial Development Finance Authority for a loan not in excess of forty
per cent of the cost of the building if financing can not be obtained from private
sources. KRS § 154.080 (1962).
7 Louisville Courier-Journal, Sept. 7, 1967, § B, at 1, col. 3.
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Commonwealth's population may increase to 3,717,000 by 1980
according to the study. This rapid growth is due largely to a
substantial reduction of out-migration, which is likely to con-
tinue. However, the same studies indicate that the movement
from rural to urban areas will be accelerated and that significant
population growth will generally be confined to the relatively
few counties which are presently urbanized, e.g., Jefferson, Fay-
ette, Kenton, Boone, Davies, Warren, McCracken, Christian,
Bullitt, Meade, and Boyd. Nevertheless, rural counties will still
be faced with the problems of rapid population increase. The
location of a major industry in a sparsely populated area will
generate the same types of growth problems as those found in a
rapidly urbanizing area.
Kentucky land use difficulties cover the full range of national
problems. The downtown areas of its cities, which have seen
little development since World War II, are prime targets for
urban renewal. Almost all of the growth occurring in metro-
politan areas has been on the fringe of the cities; thus, all of the
aesthetic and economic problems of suburban sprawl can be
found, especially in Louisville and Covington which are per-
meated with defensive incorporations.8 Further, Louisville and
Lexington may find themselves at the bottom of a megalopolistic
triangle extending from Chicago to Louisville-Lexington to Cleve-
land and back across the Great Lakes.9 This means the state must
encourage the integration of rural and urban land use planning
in order to prevent continuing urban sprawl from destroying the
open space areas which will be necessary for future use in recre-
ation and agriculture.10
It has been common to associate the problems of land use
planning solely with the problems of rapid ex-urban growth or
the deterioration of the central city in relation to its burgeoning
8 See generally EDITORS OF FORTUNE, TnE EXPLODING METROPOLIS (1956);
W. WnrE, URBAN SPRAWL 115 (1957); Anvxsony ComimsxoN ON NEr=-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, METnoPOLrrAN SociAL AND EcONObMc DIsrAnTsEs;
IMPLICATIONS FOR IN GOVEvRNuMNTAL RELATIONS IN CENTRAL CITIES AND
SUmURBs (1965).
9 The magnitude of the problems which such a megalopolis vill generate is
suggested in J. GOTrMAN, MEGALOPOLS: Tin URBAN=n NORTnWESTERN SEA-
BOARD OF THE UNITED STATES (1961).
10 Vermont recently considered legislation to protect scenic corridors in its
rural areas. See Fonoroff, Proposed Legislation For Highway Corridor Protection,
1968 URBAN LAw ANNUAL 128.
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suburbs. Although there is a great need for zoning and land use
controls in cities and counties experiencing an economic and
population decline, comparatively little attention has been focused
on the problems of such areas. Greater planning is required for
areas with limited resources, and land, which is at a premium,
must be preserved."' Controls must be exercised in such places
to prevent deterioration of commercial areas or waste of resources.
Zoning and other land use controls can aid in reserving land by
discouraging development of sparsely settled areas until such time
when a complete, self-contained area can be developed. At the
same time, development should be encouraged in areas already
being used. Land use controls will be a major step toward the im-
plementation of state policies concerned with the utilization of cur-
rently undeveloped land and other natural resources, such as
water and coal. For example, if Eastern Kentucky is to be
developed as a major recreation area for the East and Midwest,
zoning can be used to preserve timber lands and recreation sites
and to control strip mining. Land use planning is necessary to
prevent land adjacent to large, multipurpose reservoirs from being
haphazardly developed and resulting in a rural slum, thus in-
hibiting the full utilization of the reservoir's recreation potential.' 3
As an alternative to the continued megalopolistic sprawl which
engulfs a large part of our population, it has been proposed that
11 A good discussion of the use of land use controls in areas of declining
or stable population is found in H. SMrrH, THE CrrZN'S GumFn To PLAWNING
AND ZONING 132 (1963).
12See H. CAUDILL, NIGHT CoMES TO THE Cur.mEI..ANDs 376 (1962). There
is no more confused area of the law of land use planning than that of the
public's power to regulate the extraction of earth products. There is little doubt,
however, that the zoning power may be used to prohibit the extraction of earth
products especially if such extraction threatens personal safety or public health.
See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempsted, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Consolidated Rock
Products v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 368,
appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962); Village of Spillertown v. Prewitt. 171
N.W.2d 582 (Ill. 1961) (city may prohibit strip mining within its corporate
limits); Blancett v. Montgomery, 398 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1965) (city may prohibit
extraction of oil within its corporate limits). But cf., Midland Elec. Corp. v.
Knox County, 115 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 1953) (county can not limit strip mining
to ten per cent of county area). A constitutional justification for the regulation of
strip mining is suggested in Brooks, Strip Mine Reclamation and Economic
Analysis, 6 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 13 (1966).
The Attorney General has ruled, by implication, that KRS §§ 350.010-.990
regulating strip mining and reclamation do not preempt the regulation of strip
mining by cities and counties. 1966 Op. ATTx GEN. 95.
13 See Waite, The Dilemma of Water Recreation and a Suggested Solution,
1958 Wis. L. REv. 542; Yanggen and Kusler, Natural Resource Protection
Through Shoreland Regulation: Wisconsin, XLIV LAND EcoNomcs 73 (1968).
KENT Cy LA~w JouRNAL
the federal government adopt a policy of decentralizing urban
development to relieve the pressures on the big cities. This is based
on the assumption that the cultural, economic, and social ad-
vantages of the large urban center can be duplicated in small-
scale communities or new towns.14 To a large extent many expand-
ing industries have unilaterally adopted this policy, stimulating
the growth of many small communities and creating the demand
for new urban facilities. Kentucky, a major beneficiary of these
new industrial expansions because of its proximity to the major
markets of the East and Midwest, would probably benefit equally
from a federal decentralization policy such as the location of major
scientific facilities outside large urban centers. Thus, the demand
for new urban facilities would be further intensified. Indeed, the
state has already begun to plan on the assumption that, at a
minimum, industry will continue its policy of locating plants in
rural and small urban areas.
Industrial development, produced by the operation of the free
market, will not provide enough of the economic relief Kentucky
needs for its chronically depressed areas. The population of
Eastern Kentucky is scattered througout the landscape in small
clusters and this fragmentation makes it impossible to achieve the
concentration of labor, capital, and education necessary to in-
duce industrial location and thus provide a stable and prosperous
economy. The state will have to develop new urban areas to pro-
vide a base for industry.15 A state-sponsored new town program
which combines private investment with government subsidy must
be formulated.
I. CREATION OF PLANNING UNITS
The provisions of the new enabling legislation for the for-
mation of planning units are designed to encourage the creation
of functional planning jurisdictions. A continuing criticism of
city planning is that land use controls are being exercised by
governmental units whose jurisdictions do not correspond to the
14 See Winston, An Urbanization Pattern for the United States: Some Con-
siderations for the Decentralization of Excellence, XLIII LAND EcoNo~'ucs 1
(1967).
15 See UNrwvsrrY oF KErucxy- DEzpT OF ARcHIrEu, NE;W TowNs FOR
THm APPALACmN RE IONS (1960); Symposium-New Towns Development, 1965
WAsH. U.L.Q. 1.
[Vol. 56,
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geographic areas faced with common physical environmental prob-
lems.' The enabling legislation does not attempt to abolish the
belief, a century and a half old, in the moral superiority of smaller
units of government,17 but it does encourage units confronted
with common problems to unite voluntarily to seek solutions.
Those seeking a balance of power between central, state, and
local governments should realize that the answer lies in creating
more powerful units of local and state government rather than
in attempting to effect a blanket circumscription of higher
authority.
Section 100.113 of the new enabling legislation permits the
formation of three types of planning units: 1) an independent
planning unit, which is defined in Section 100.111 (14) as a unit
comprised of a city or county engaged in planning operations; 2)
joint city-county planning units; and 3) regional planning units
comprised of groups of counties and their cities.
1. Independent Planning Units
Section 100.117 provides that an independent planning unit
can be formed only after the required procedure for the establish-
ment of a joint planning unit is unsuccessful. A city desiring to
establish a planning unit must first interrogate, in writing, the
county and every other city in the county "to determine whether
they desire to enter into an agreement to form a joint planning
unit." Each subdivision interrogated has sixty days in which to
respond. If they fail to respond, or respond in the negative, the
city may proceed to establish an independent planning unit. If
the c6unty responds affirmatively, a joint planning unit is created
and all other cities in the county are precluded from forming an
independent unit. Other cities in the county have the option to
join the unit after it has been organized. A county may also
initiate a joint planning unit although the statute is somewhat
unclear about the procedure it must follow. Section 100.121 (2)
provides: "A county shall interrogate every incorporated city
within its boundaries and otherwise be subject to the following
procedure established for independent planning operations." Pre-
16 See, e.g., D. WEBSTEa, URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC POLICY
49-50 (1958); ADvIsORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMiENTAL RELATIONS, RE-
PORT: PERFORmANCE OF URBAN FUNCTIONS LOCAL AND AREAWIDE 50-51 (1963).17 See, e.g., J. DILLON, MUNICIAL COPoRATIoNs § 15 (5th ed. 1911).
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sumably this section means that if the county and one city in the
county agree to enter into a joint planning unit, all other cities
are precluded from creating an independent unit.
2. Joint Planning Units
Section 100.121 makes clear what is implied in Section 100.117,
i.e., the legislative body of cities together with the county fiscal
court,18 may enter into a voluntary agreement to form a joint
planning unit.19 Section 100.121 (2) contains one of the few special
provisions in the legislation. It states that if a joint city-county
planning unit is formed in a county with a city of the first class,
all other cities in the county shall be parts of the unit.2 0 This is
a desirable provision for it insures that a unified planning unit
exists for the state's largest metropolitan area, Jefferson County
and Louisville, and it begins to eliminate the problems caused by
the fragmentation of municipal units in Jefferson County.21
The legislation does not expressly provide a procedure for
withdrawing from a joint planning unit, but the intent of the
Legislature was that either the city or the county may unilaterally
withdraw from the agreement at any time22 However, the legisla-
tion severely limits any withdrawal by requiring that if a city
withdraws it must follow the interrogation procedure set out in
Section 100.117 for establishment of an independent planning
unit. Thus, a county can force the city to either stay in the
planning unit or forego planning operations by threatening to re-
spond affirmatively to the city's required interrogation. Pre-
sumably, the same "club" is available to the city under Section
100.117 (2) if the county threatens to withdraw from the unit.
18 The power of the fiscal courts is now co-extensive with that of cities.
KRS § 100.831 (1966).
19KRS § 100.127 (1966) specifies the formal requisites for an agreement
and its implementation. It must be in writing and "contain all details which are
necessary for the establishing and administration of the planning unit in regard
to the planning commission organization, preparation of plans, and aids to plan
implementation."20 See KRS § 100.137 which details the special provisions applicable to
Louisville and Jefferson County.
21Jefferson County had, on October 5, 1967, 62 municipalities. There were
51 sixth class cities, 7 fifth class cities, 3 fourth class cities, and 1 first class
city. The latest mini-city, Meadow Vale, took in an area of 933 square feet.
Great oaks from little acorns grow.22 KRS § 100.127(2) (1966) provides that the agreement for the planning
unit shall be in existence as long as two of the original signatories are operating
under it, despite the fact that other signatories have withdrawn.
[Vol.56,
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This section should be successful in keeping the unit together in
the face of short term disagreements between the city and county
over a controversial planning commission decision. The right to
withdraw unilaterally from a unit will impede planning if with-
drawals are simple and thus become common. The section could
be amended to prohibit dissolution only after the legislative
bodies of all participating units have agreed to it, but this is
probably not desirable. Once a minimum consensus among parti-
cipating units dissolves, planning verges on chaos with the private
land owner losing out in the ensuing power struggle due to delays
and irrational decisions. Thus, it is better to give up the game
once a player decides he doesn't want to play any more.
3. Regional Planning Units
Section 100.123 permits the formation of regional planning
units when the legislative bodies of the cities and counties, com-
prising two or more adjacent planning units, voluntarily agree to
its formation.23 The combined territory of these units must form
a logical functioning area, or portion thereof, by reasons of phy-
sical, economic, or social features. The standards for transferring
planning functions from the existing units to the regional unit
are extremely flexible, for the former may continue in existence
and transfer some functions to the regional unit, or the regional
unit may replace all existing planning units and their duties. The
only requirement is a written agreement which spells out the
division of functions between the joint and regional units and
the financial contribution each legislative unit is to make to the
regional planning unit.
The purpose of these sections is to encourage the formation
of functional units, so that planning will not be prescribed by
artificial political boundaries but will extend to a geographical
area with common problems capable of physical solutions. The
statute is partly successful in encouraging the formation of func-
tional units, because it continues to permit the formation of
fragmented city-county units. Section 100.121 provides that
"combinations may include any combination of the cities with
23 Th1is is perhaps an improvement over the previous enabling legislation
whichlrequired gubernatorial approval of a regional planning commission. KRS
§ 147.130 (1964), repealed by KES § 100.991(3) (1966).
1968]
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their counties or their parts thereof. . . ." Under this section, the
county could agree to exclude portions of the county from the
planning unit. There will probably be considerable pressure to
do just that in rural areas, for most farmers feel threatened by
zoning. This provision is unfortunate for it may inhibit counties
from using land use controls to enhance agricultural and recrea-
tional potential. The General Assembly should require that if a
joint city-county planning unit is created, its jurisdiction must be
county-wide except for self-excluded incorporated cities. Another
possibility is that the small cities in the county may exclude the
larger city or cities from participation in a planning unit. For
example, if a small city initiates the interrogation procedure and
only the county responds affirmatively, the largest city in the
county will be forced to join the unit or abstain from creating a
planning unit. If the largest city elects to abstain, the joint city-
county planning unit created will lack jurisdiction over the area
in which the major land use problems are concentrated. The
practical impact of this section will be to force the larger city to
join the unit. To avoid the possibility of exclusion, the Legisla-
ture should make participation of all cities in a joint city-county
planning unit mandatory once any city in the county has agreed
to its creation.
The encouragement of the creation of regional planning units
is commendable but may prove to be ineffective in the face of the
historic unwillingness of metropolitan areas with common prob-
lems to unite until forced to do so. However, a considerable spur
to regional planning has been given by the federal government
which requires regional planning as a pre-condition to participa-
tion in many federal programs. 24 Still more direct intervention by
state government may be necessary.25 Kentucky, at present, has
chosen only to delegate authority to the local units of government
to establish regional planning commissions. If they fail to take
the initiative, which seems likely, the state may have to either
designate regional planning units and require the affected cities
24 For a history of federal involvement in regional planning, see Grove,
Metropolitan Planning?, 21 MmMI L. REv. 60, 78-84 (1966).
2
5 See SuBcoamrrran ON INTEmrOVERN'MNTAL RELATIONS OF THE COm-
MTEE ON GovERNENT OPERATIONS, THE EFEc'TrvmqsS or MrrnoporxrAN
PLANNIc, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1963). This print was preprxed by the Har-
vard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies. For a discussion of recent legislative
innovations, see Grove, supra note 24, at 91-93.
[Vol. 56,
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and counties to enter into a regional planning commission, dele-
gate this authority to the executive, or create an administrative
body to make these decisions, if the objectives to be gained by
regional planning are to be achieved.
26
4. Interstate Regional Planning
A major deficiency in this portion of the enabling legislation
is failure to deal with the problems of interstate regional planning.
This is especially important in Kentucky since most of the state's
population is clustered along the Ohio River.27 Henderson,
Owensboro, Louisville, Covington-Newport, and Ashland all face
common interstate problems with adjacent urban areas in Indiana,
Ohio and West Virginia. Interstate inter-governmental coopera-
tion can formally be achieved by two methods: 1) the elected
officials of cities and counties within a metropolitan area, together
with officials from other public bodies, may voluntarily agree to
form some sort of institution for regional cooperation and plan-
ning; 2) the legislatures of the two states may enter into a compact
under art. I, sec. 10, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution to
transfer certain area-wide functions and services to an interstate
authority.
Metropolitan councils of government have been growing since
the first was formed in 1954 in the greater Detroit area.28 Their
importance was raised considerably in 1965 when the federal
government announced that the councils were eligible to ad-
minister federal urban planning grants under the 701 program.29
Chapter 100 of KRS provides no specific authorization for the
formation of metropolitan councils, but such authority is not
absolutely necessary since the requisite legal status to qualify for
701 (g) funds can be obtained through the formation of a non-
20See Coiniar=EE FOR ECONOmIC DEvELoPonNT, MODERNIZIrG LocAL
GovEmmNTr To SECURE A BALANCED FEDERALISm (1966) (Statement of Re-
search and Policy Committee).2 7 Four of the twenty-six standard statistical interstate metropolitan areas lie
partly within Kentucky. They are: (1) Evansville, Ind.-Henderson, Ky.; (2)
Louisville, Ky.-New Albany, Ind.; (3) Cincinnati, Ohio-Northern Kentucky; andS4) Huntington, West Va.-Ashland, Ky.-Ironton, Ohio. This last area has the
elightful problem of dealing with three HUD regional offices for interstate
projects.2
8 See REPORT OF ADVISORY Coin usSIoN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
MEaovoLrrAN CoUNCiES OF GovEmN cENT (1966).29 Pub. L. No. 77-560 (Aug. 2, 1954), 68 Stat. 640 (1954) provides funds
for the preparation of planning studies and implementation programs.
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profit corporation under existing state law. The disadvantage of
forcing cities to choose this method is that the state has no con-
trol over the composition of, or powers and duties assumed by,
the council. The scope of the councils ranges from being merely a
communication vehicle for local government officials to being a
super-planning agency for the region, but in all cases their capacity
has remained advisory.
The ultimate purpose of such councils should be to study the
feasibility of compacts creating interstate authorities to undertake
those functions and provide those services which can be most
effectively performed on an area-wide basis. The practical prob-
lems of securing agreements among the feudal barons of local
government has severely limited the use of the compact, but
there is a growing awareness on the part of politicians that the
physical problems of the metropolitan area can only be solved on
a joint basis, regardless of state political boundaries. For example,
the states of Missouri and Illinois entered into a compact to create
a Bi-State Metropolitan Development District for the greater St.
Louis area to: provide bridge, tunnel, airport, and terminal faci-
lities; to plan and establish policies for sewerage and drainage
facilities; and, to submit plans to the individual communities for
the coordination of street systems, water supply and waste disposal
works, recreation areas and general land use patterns.30
The Supreme Court held in Dyer v. Sims3l that the compact
clause permits the states to delegate powers and functions to inter-
state agencies for the solution of common problems, but the
Court has not yet ruled on the authority of a state to delegate
powers that are inconsistent with its constitution. The issue was
raised in Dyer but Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority,
avoided it in characteristic fashion by deciding that there was, in
fact, no conflict, while Justices Reed and Jackson concurred, at-
tempting to explain the majority opinion. The major significance
30Compact between Missouri and Illinois creating Bi-State Development
Authority and Bi-State Metropolitan District, Mo. STAT. § 70.370-.440 (1949).
See also, ADvIsoRy Co=vmnrE ON INTERGovERNmNTAL REAImNS, GoxERN-
MENTAL STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING IN MErOPOLITAN AREAS, 16-
17 (1961).
31341 U.S. 22 (1950). For a discussion of the Compact Clause and inter-
state metropolitan areas, see J. WnTERs, INTERSTATE METROPOLITAN AR.EAS
(1962); Dixon, Constitutional Basis for Regionalism: Centralization, Interstate
Compacts, Foreign Regional Taxation, 38 GEo. WASH. L. IRxv. 47 (1964). See
generally F. Znrmu~is & M. WENDE L, TiiE INTEPSTATE COzPACt SINCE 192-5
(1951).
[Vol. 56,
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of the decision is the holding that the existence of a conflict be-
tween a compact and a state constitution is a federal question, be-
cause the interests of other states are involved. The case probably
also stands for the proposition that a state cannot delegate powers
inconsistent with its constitution. Justice Frankfurter's statement
that "what that obligation is, and whether it conflicts with a dis-
ability of a State to undertake it is quite another . . . question.
... ,,"32 implies that he considered state constitutions as a limita-
Lion on the state's power to join a compact.
The General Assembly should come to grips with the prob-
lems of interstate metropolitan areas by providing specific grants
of authority for cities, counties, and other units of local govern-
ment, such as special districts, to enter into metropolitan councils
of government. The legislation should provide for their establish-
ment, membership, financing, staffing, and powers and duties. It
should specify that one of their functions is to explore the feasi-
bility of performing certain urban services through interstate
compacts.
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL LAND USE CONTROLS
Section 100.131 gives independent city planning units power
to control the development of territory outside their corporate
limits but within the county.33 The extraterritorial exercise of
land use controls has traditionally been urged on the grounds that
cities must be able to control development of areas which will
probably be annexed into the city within the foreseeable future,
so that use patterns will be consistent.3 4 Section 100.131 permits
an independent planning unit 5 to exercise extraterritorial juris-
32 West Virginia ex rel Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1951). See
generally Fordham, Decision-Making in Expanding Urban Life, 21 OMao ST. L. J.
274, 282-83 (1960); Note, Congress and the Port of New York Authority: Federal
Supervisor of Interstate Compacts, 70 YALa L.J. 812 (1961).
33 Chapter 100 does not expressly give cities the po~ver to plan in relation
to territory outside their corporate limits. This defect should be remedied by
the General Assembly.
34 Melli & Devoy, Extraterritorial Planning and Urban Growth, 1959 Wis. L.
REv. 55. For an excellent criticism of the limited utility of extraterritorial land
use controls as a means of controlling regional development, see Becker,
Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Development, 1966
WAsH. U. L.Q. 1, 23-S0.
35 Presumably a city can not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction when it
becomes a member of a joint planning unit, but this prohibition is not expressly
stated in the statute.
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diction for the purposes of subdivision regulations up to five miles
from all points on the city's boundary, but not beyond the county
line. If the boundaries of two planning units overlap, the bound-
ary of their jurisdiction is midway between them. This power does
not apply to an incorporated city which is not a member of the
planning unit. If the consent of the fiscal court is obtained, the
city may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction for the purposes of
zoning and official map ordinances. Courts have traditionally
been reluctant to sanction the exercise of extraterritorial juris-
diction in the absence of express statutory authority. Thus, Section
100.131 removes a barrier to control of fringe development.
Historically, there has been considerable doubt about the
constitutionality of extraterritorial land use controls.3 It has been
argued that these controls constitute a violation of the property
owner's right to due process of law, because he does not vote for
the officials who regulate him and he receives no benefits from
the city which controls him. It is the modem variant of the "tax-
ation without representation" argument.37 Courts that have re-
cently passed on these constitutional arguments have held that
there is no violation of the property owner's right to due process.38
The reason given is that the state legislature has absolute control
over the powers and boundaries of municipalities and counties
and, thus, it may delegate to a city the power, which the state
could exercise, to control land outside their corporate limits. 39
The property owner's right to due process is preserved through his
right to seek relief from the state legislature. This is an empty,
although perhaps useful, fiction, given the many problems of
fringe development. Due process objections to Section 100.131
should be met by Section 100.133 (2), which allows the county
judge of each affected county to appoint a member to the planning
38See Malone v. Williams, 118 Tenn. App. 390, 103 S.W. 789 (1907), dis-
cussed in Goodman, The Legal Basis of Extrateritorial Zoning, 4 TULSA L. REv.
21 (1967).3 7 For an analysis of the relationship between the municipalities' power to
tax and zone extraterritorially, see Baer Extratenritorial Zoning, 32 Nomn
DAmm L. Rlv. 367, 381-86 (1957).38 Schlientz v. City of North Platte, 172 Neb. 477, 110 N.W.2d 58 (1961);
City of Raleigh v. Morand, 247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957).
39 Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v. City of Anchorage, 393 S.W.2d 608
(Ky. 1965) upheld the power of the Legislature to withdraw the zoning power
from fifth and sixth class cities in Jefferson County. See also Southeastern Dis-
plays, Inc. v. Ward, 414 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1967) (state may delegate power to
regulate billboards to Department of Highways).
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unit exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, "in addition to the
number of members specified for that planning commission."
Another accepted rationale is that both the persons residing
within and beyond the city limits may be subjected to additional
expenditures of public monies and a reduced level of services
and amenities if the city does not have the power to control ad-
jacent areas which may be annexed in the foreseeable future. This
rationale, however, circumscribes the function of extraterritorial
land use controls and raises the possibility that, while a grant of
jurisdiction may be constitutional, the regulation may be un-
constitutional as applied. If the courts attribute this rather narrow
purpose to Section 100.131, then a burden may be imposed on the
city to prove that the area may become annexd in the foreseeable
future.
Two Kentucky cases which have considered the problem sug-
gest that this burden is constitutionally required. In Smeltzer v.
Messer,40 a fourth class city in the Greater Cincinnati Area at-
tempted to zone land in an adjacent city located in a different
county. The Court of Appeals held that if the city does not have
the power to annex it cannot zone, and since the city could not
annex territory in an adjacent county, it could not zone extra-
territorially. This case can be read as holding merely that a city
cannot exercise extraterritorial powers absent express statutory
authorization. However, the Court added some very significant
dictum suggesting that there are constitutional limitations on the
exercise of extraterritorial land use controls. Doubt was cast on its
validity: "The city's action, if sustained, seriously impairs the
rights of persons owning property beyond its limits who have no
voice in its legislative policies, and who receive no logical
recognizable benefit to such property from the city government." 41
A subsequent case, American Sign Co. v. Fowler,42 suggests
that this dictum has been adopted by the Court of Appeals as a
constitutional standard for extraterritorial land use controls. The
facts of American Sign are unclear, but it appears that the fiscal
court refused to grant a requested zoning change from agricultural
uses to a classification permitting amusement activities, i.e., drive-
40311 Ky. 692, 225 S.W.2d 96 (1949).
41 Id. at 693-94, 225 S.W.2d at 97-98.
42 276 S.W.2d 651 (Ky. 1955).
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in theaters, and failed to assign any territory in the county for
such uses. The Court held that the fiscal court had no authority to
zone county-wide (a point which is now moot for those counties
with a joint city-county planning commission) and invalidated
the city's attempt to zone areas outside its corporate limits if they
were within the "municipal area," which the Court defined as
that which bore a relationship to the planning and zoning of the
city. This, the Court found, was a conclusion of law and con-
cluded that although the area was related economically, com-
mercially, and socially to the city it was not within the "municipal
area" of the city because there was no proof that it would be an-
nexed in the future. Thus, the requisite showing of a relationship
between the property and the planning and zoning of the city
had not been made.
The decision seems to be a clear example of judicial hostility
toward rural land use controls. The relevant question for the
Court was the power of the city and county to exclude a lawful
business from the county. The Court might well have concluded
that the exclusion was unwarranted but that if the use was per-
mitted the city could regulate it through extraterritorial con-
trols. 43 This holding might have been justified on the theory that
a city adjacent to the Blue Grass area, whose economic base de-
pends in part on the aesthetic qualities of its famed horse farms,
ought to be able to control land uses outside its corporate limits
in order to preserve the integrity of what is generally recognized
as a fine example of a privately created greenbelt.
The constitutional standard apparently adopted by American
Sign does not appear to be required either by the due process or
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The property owner's
rights are not automatically violated when the state delegates to
a city the power to control the development of land outside its
corporate limits. The uncoordinated development of fringe areas
can adversely affect the city even if it will not be annexed to the
city in the foreseeable future. This is especially true if the city has
a policy of refusing to undertake involuntary annexations. For
4 3 For a good discussion of the problems of exclusion of an activity from a
county, see Exton Quarries v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Whitehead, 228
A.2d 169 (Pa. 1966). See generally Mandelker, Control of Competition as a
Proper Purpose in Zoning, 1962 ZoNiNm DIcxzS 33.
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these reasons the foreseeable annexation standard adopted in
American Sign should not be followed.
The need for judicial review of the application of Section
100.131 remains. The five mile permissible radius of jurisdiction
is the most liberal in the United States, and provides small cities
with the possibility of creating instant empires over the surround-
ing countryside.44 Moreover, the problem at present will be con-
fined to smaller cities, since the two largest cities in the state-
Louisville and Lexington-have a city-county planning com-
mission. The inherent conservatism of local politicians and the
necessity to obtain consent of the fiscal court will, in most cases,
operate as an effective curb on potential abuses, but the possibility
remains very real. Courts should read the words, "up to five
miles," as requiring them to review the application of extra-
territorial land use controls. The traditional standards of "reason-
ableness" for administrative review do not furnish an adequate
guide, and the standard suggested by American Sign is too narrow.
One possible solution might be to place the burden of proof
on the city to show that the proposed regulation is necessary to
implement its comprehensive plan. Once the city introduces
evidence that the regulation is necessary in light of its compre-
hensive plan, the burden of going forward should shift to the
aggrieved land owner. For example, if the city sought to impose
subdivision controls on a small development outside the city
limits-and not in an area of potential annexation-and justified
it on the grounds that it was the city's policy to control residential
development throughout the county by imposing uniform stand-
ards on city and county development to encourage the orderly
timing of the development of land adjacent to the city, the
regulation should be sustained. There is no need for the courts to
engage in a detailed examination of the relationship between the
city and the area sought to be controlled, as in American Sign.
The function of judicial review, under Section 100.131, should
be to prevent flagrant abuses of the power, such as attempts to
control land which is spatially remote from the city and lacks the
traditional ties of commercial and social intercourse.
44The former Kentucky statutory standard was approved in Becker, supra
note 34, at 54.
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Courts are becoming more attuned to abuse and are in-
creasingly willing to scrutinize the object for which the regula-
tion is enacted and to define the exact nature of legitimate pur-
poses. For example, politicians should not be permitted to use the
threat of regulation to coerce the land owner into a course of
action desired by local politicians. Courts have a variety of
doctrines, such as improper purpose, false classifications, and
spurious motives, to support a decision invalidating abuses of the
power to control land outside the city's corporate limits.
45
III. PLANNING COMMISSION ADMINISTRATION
The sections regulating planning commission administration
contain two new provisions designed to upgrade the quality of
commission members. Section 100.153 allows reimbursement for
expenses and compensation for citizen members and permits
public officials and employees of participating cities to be com-
pensated. Section 100.157 provides that, in addition to neglect of
duty and malfeasance, a planning commission member may be
removed for a conflict of interest. These changes are important
since land use controls often fail to achieve their objectives be-
cause they are either administered in a haphazard manner by lay-
men ignorant of basic planning concepts or they are used for
personal gain at the expense of the community. These faults are
especially prevalent in a state like Kentucky where entrenched
45 This analysis is suggested in Hagman, Book Review, 84 U. Cmc. L. REV.
469, 474-79 (1967). Professor Hagman lists nine examples of common abuses
of the zoning power which courts are increasingly willing to curb by defining with
more precision the legitimate functions of land use controls. They are: (1) zoning
for an improper purpose; (2) failure of legislators to follow designated standards;
(3) bribery and corruption; (4) municipalities ignoring their orn precedents;
(5) municipal disregard of court decisions; (6) regulations which constitute
takings but which are not so held; (7) false classification cases; (8) spurious
motives given for a decision; (9) test cases brought by municipalities which are
not subsequently evenly applied.
Recent examples of this kind of analysis include Fogg v. City of South
Miami, 183 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1966) in which the court held that drive-up retail
businesses could not be excluded from downtown solely to force people out of
their cars and on to the streets where they would be more likely to make impulse
purchases; De Sena v. Gulde, 24 App. Div. 2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1965)
where it was generally conceded that the highest and best use of the land was for
an industrial park but it was reclassified residential because it was adjacent to a
negro area in order to head off threats of violence and boycotts to local business-
men; and City of Ashland v. Hecks, Inc., 407 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966) where the
Court of Appeals held that a discount house which was singled out for enforce-
ment of the Sunday Closing Laws was denied equal protection of the laws
when established businesses repeatedly violated them but were not prosecuted.
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interests tend to dominate all levels of government. Of course, no
enabling legislation can deal with the corruption and influence
peddling which plagues municipal government, but all steps need-
ed to encourage the participation of disinterested and informed
citizens in the planning process should be taken.
1. Necessity For Commission
Before a planning unit can undertake planning studies and
enact regulations, a planning commission must be established.
The commission must consist of from five to fifteen members.
Section 100.141 provides that members are appointed by either
the county judge or the mayor of the city depending on the type
of planning unit created. If the commission is joint, the member-
ship ratio is fixed pursuant to a written agreement between the
members of the unit, but if only one county joins with one city,
Section 100.133 (2) requires equal representation. Two-thirds of
the members must be citizen members rather than elected public
officials.
2. Term of Office of Members
Section 100.143 fixes the term of office for citizen members at
four years, but public officials serve for a period co-extensive with
their elected term. When the commission is initially appointed
the terms must be staggered, according to regulation or agreement,
so that a proportionate number of the members serve one, two,
or three year terms thus insuring that the appointing authority
can put new blood on the commission at regular intervals. This
pattern must be continued for reappointments and new appoint-
ments.
Section 100.147 requires that a vacancy must be filled within
sixty days by the appropriate appointing authority, i.e., the mayor
or county judge, but if no appointment is made, the vacancy can
be filled by the planning commission. This is an attempt to
minimize the possibility that planning operations will be halted
by a political in-fight. For example, if the county judge and plan-
ning commission are feuding, the county judge could delay plan-
ning operations by holding up an appointment until favorable
concessions were extracted from commission members. The sixty
day limitation is a decent compromise between giving the ap-
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pointing authority adequate power to conduct a search for a
qualified replacement and preventing him from using the time
period as a club against the planning commission.
3. Quorum Rules
Section 100.171 provides the quorum rules. A simple majority
of the total commission membership constitutes a quorum for any
official business46 "except that a vote of a simple majority of the
total membership shall be necessary to adopt or amend the com-
mission's bylaws or for elements of the comprehensive plan or
regulations." This last phrase "or regulations" is extremely ambi-
guous. A regulation is defined in Section 100.111 (18) as "any
enactment by the legislative body of a city whether it is an ordi-
nance, resolution, or an order and shall include regulations for
the subdivision of land." But the Legislature seems to have in-
tended that only regulations which depart from the comprehensive
plan must be adopted by a simple majority of the total member-
ship. However, it could be argued that because there is a comma
separating "or for elements of the comprehensive plan or regula-
tions" from the rest of the sentence, Section 100.171 means that
all regulations must be adopted by a simple majority of the total
membership since, in theory, all regulations are enacted to im-
plement the comprehensive plan. Legislative revision of this
section is necessary to clarify this ambiguity.
Any member of the planning commission who has a direct or
indirect financial interest in the outcome of any question before
the commission must disqualify himself from voting and cannot
be counted for purpose of a quorum. Section 100.171 reverses
Sims v. Bradley47 which held that a member who disqualified him-
self from voting could still be counted for purposes of a quorum.
Section 100.167 requires that the commission hold at least six
meetings a year, but it may agree on a greater number. Special
meetings may be called by the chairman if he gives at least seven
days notice to the other members.
461f a member of the commission is present but abstains from voting, he
will be counted as an afrmative vote. Pierson-Trapp Co. v. Knippenberg, 387
S.W.2d 587 (Ky. 1965).
47 809 Ky. 626, 218 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1949).
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4. Staff Assistance
Section 100.173 authorizes the planning commission to employ
a technical planning staff or to contract with consultants in order
to carry out the provisions of Chapter 100. Since most Kentucky
cities and counties receive their technical planning assistance from
the state, this provision will not be used often.48 This assistance is
provided by the Division of Community Planning and Develop-
ment of the Department of Commerce. The Division is currently
divided into five sections to formulate programs of state-wide
significance. These are: (1) state planning, (2) workable program,
(3) fiscal, (4) codes, and (5) design. The Division also maintains
fourteen staff offices throughout the state to serve local communi-
ties which cannot support a full-time planner. If the community
is large enough to require a full-time planner, the state will supply
a full-time staff consisting of a planner, secretary, and draftsman.
These planners function as employees of the city or county. It is
probable that the current state administration will reorganize
the Department of Commerce, but it is unlikely that the state will
cease giving technical assistance to the majority of Kentucky cities
and counties.
5. Removal of Members for Conflict of Interest
The most important addition to the Kentucky statute is the
provision for removing planning commission members in case of
a conflict of interest. The previous enabling legislation limited
removal to inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or improper
conduct. Section 100.157 permits the appointing authority to re-
move a planning commission member for a conflict of interest
and Section 100.217 (8) subjects members of the board of adjust-
ment to removal for the same reasons. Commission members are
required by Section 100.171 to disclose any "direct or indirect"
financial interest in the outcome of any question and, if such
interest is present, to refrain from voting. However, the statute
does not provide a procedure which would permit applicants to
48 The structure of state planning assistance is taken from a brochure pre-
pared for the Honorable Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice President of the United
States (on file with the Kentucky Law Journal). It is beyond the scope of this
paper to study the impact of technical assistance provided by state rather than
local employees.
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institute removal proceedings. Thus, removal rests in the dis-
cretion of the appointing authority. Nevertheless, Sections 100.157
and .171 should provide a standard for judicial review, permitting
a court to invalidate a planning commission or board of adjust-
ment decision in which one or more members had a conflict of
interest. Both the applicant and the public suffer when the com-
mission's or board's decisions are colored by the prospect of
financial gain to its members. If these sections are going to have
any impact on the quality of zoning administration in Kentucky,
the Court of Appeals must begin to set rigorous standards or these
sections will stand for nothing more than an empty gesture toward
good government.
In the nineteenth century the courts began to develop a com-
mon law conflict of interest based on the biblical injunction that
a man cannot serve two masters.49 Public officials were analogized
to the trustee of a cestui que trust and found to have a fiduciary
duty to the public to refrain from engaging in decision-making
for personal gain and from placing themselves in a position where
they would be tempted to do so. Having erected this formidable
doctrine to keep public officials pure and above the squalor of
money politics, courts began to erode it by holding that the
doctrine of separation of powers forbade review of decisions
based on an alleged conflict of interest. Cooley put it very neatly:
The same presumption that legislative action has been
devised and adopted on adequate information, and not under
the influence of corrupt motives, will be applied to the dis-
cretionary action of municipal bodies and of a state legisla-
ture, and will preclude in the one case as in all others, all col-
lateral attacks.50
Kentucky appears to have taken this position in Adams v. City
of Richmond. 51 That case involved a claim that a planning com-
mission decision should be invalidated because certain members
of the commission had made up their minds before the meeting.
This would seem to be a gentle method of alleging a conflict of
interest. The Court refused to admit evidence of statements made
4 9 The President & Trustees of the City of San Diego v. San Diego & L. A.
R.R., 44 Cal. 106 (1872). "'The general principle is that no man can faithfully
serve two masters, whose interests are or may be in conflict.
50T. COOLEY, CONSTTUTIONAL LIMrATxoNs 451-55 (8th ed. 1927).
51340 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Ky. 1960). See also Tharp v. Urban Renewal and
Community Dev. Auth., 389 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965).
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by members outside the meeting and dismissed the argument with
the sweeping observation: "whether or not the deliberation was
extensive and open-minded is of no concern." Let the good times
roll.
The traditional argument in favor of separation of powers,
i.e., judicial inquiry into the motives of legislators will hamstring
the efficient operation of government, must be refined much more
than it has been before it can be applied to the land planning
decisions of cities and counties. The difficulty of finding a conflict
of interest might properly dissuade a court from inquiring into
the motives of state or national legislators, but it should not deter
an inquiry into conflicts of interest among members of a planning
commission. Planning commissions are not large decision-making
bodies; so it will be much easier to find a causal relationship be-
tween the conflict and the decision. 2 The problem is one of
defining the scope of legislative discretion necessary for the
efficient functioning of local government. Unless one is willing to
argue that conflicts of interest and the resulting graft and cor-
ruption are necessary for government to operate, there is no sound
reason for the blanket refusal of the courts to circumscribe legisla-
tive action by carefully drawn standards of impartiality. The
courts must extricate themselves from the conceptual trap into
which they have fallen. A recent federal district court decision
from the District of Columbia, Jarrott v. Schriever,53 suggests
that the problem need not be conceptualized as one of reviewing
legislative motives, but rather it should be viewed as one of
guaranteeing the applicant's right to procedural due process. In
Jarrott a parcel of property next to the plaintiff's was purchased
for the Russian embassy, and the proposed use required a special
permit from the Board of Zoning Adjustment. The purchase was
opposed by adjoining property owners. The board members, in
the words of the court, were subject to "soft," but "secret,"
"covert," and "ex parte" persuasion to grant the change by high
52 See Mills v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 134 A.2d 250 (Conn.
1960). Courts have always been dissatisfied with the immunity given to corrupt
public officials by the separation of powers doctrine. Initial inroads in the doctrine
were made by classifying decisions such as those of a board of adjustment as
quasi-judicial and thus subject to judicial review. The same classification waPnot
generally extended to map amendments. The cases are collected and analyzed in
Note, 57 MicH. L. REv. 453 (1958).
C3 225 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1964).
KENTUCKY LAW JourNAL[V
federal officials, including the Department of State. The board
could not refuse to do their patriotic duty, and the change was
granted. The district court reversed, finding that there was an
intent to influence the board and reasoning that the protestants
were deprived of a fair and impartial hearing.54
The Kentucky statute has three sections dealing with conflict
of interest, but none define it clearly. Sections 100.157 and .217 (8)
provide for removal for "conflict of interest," and Section 100.171
requires the disclosure of "any direct or indirect financial interest
in the outcome of any question before the body .... Presumably,
this "definition" would be used in applying Sections 100.157 and
.217 (8). A more complete definition is given by the New York
City Bar Association, and it should serve as an amplification of
Section 100.171. A conflict of interest situation is there defined as
involving the
interest of a government official in the proper administration
of his office, and the official's interest in his private economic
affairs. A conflict does not necessarily presuppose that the
action of an official favoring one of these interests winl in fact
resolve the conflict to his own personal advantage. If a man
is in a position of conflicting interests he is subject to the
temptation however he resolves the issues.55
This definition requires that two inquiries be made in deciding
if a decision should be invalidated because a conflict of interest
situation exists. First it must be determined that the individual
stood to gain financially as a result of his decision. This is re-
quired by Section 100.171 which defines conflict of interest as
"any direct or indirect financial interest in the outcome of any
question.. . ." The second inquiry focuses on the causal relation-
ship between the alleged conflict of interest and the individual's
decision. The individual need not actually profit from his
decision. The emphasis should not be on the actual gain realized
but on the situation in which the individual placed himself. The
aim of the statute is to eliminate the temptation to profit at the
expense of the public, and thus a decision should be invalidated
541d. at 884. The court relied on WKAT, Inc. v. FCC, 296 F.2d 375
(D.C. Cir. 1958) which suggested that surreptitious evidence of attempts to in-
fluence public officials was a violation of the applicant's right to procedural due
process in an administrative hearing.
55B. MANNIG, FEDERAL CONtaCT OF INTEnEsT LAw 2-3 (1964).
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if it is reasonable to infer that action adverse to the public interest
might have been taken. As stated in a leading case:
The evil lies not in influence improperly exercised but
rather in the creation of a situation tending to weaken public
confidence and to undermine the sense of security of indi-
vidual rights which the property owner must always feel as-
sured will exist in the exercise of the zoning power.06
The court's task in applying Section 100.171 will be to walk
a line between attracting qualified citizens to the commission who
will naturally have varied financial interests within the com-
mission's jurisdiction and deterring those who are unwilling to
perform their duties in the public interest. A definition of direct
conflict will not be difficult.57 A good example is found in Mc-
Namara v. Borough of Saddle River.58 There, a council member
owned property within two hundred feet of a proposed school
site. To maintain the value of his property for high quality resi-
dential use he voted against the necessary map amendment and
the court invalidated it on the ground of conflict of interest.
Equally clear is Schauer v. City of Miami,59 where it was alleged
that a council member gained $600,000 by voting for a map
amendment. However, the court blandly evoked the presumption
of pureness of legislative heart to vaidate the decision. Such a de-
cision is inexcusable and should not be followed.
A definition of indirect conflict is more difficult to formulate,
but it should not be unduly difficult if courts will focus on the
situation in which the member is placed. A good example of the
court's failure to do this is found in Coffin v. City of Lee's Sum-
mitt.60 A planning commission member owned one-third of a
ready-mix cement company in which the applicant construction
company owned the other two-thirds. The member voted in a
manner favorable to the construction company, but the court re-
5o Daly v. Town Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 191 A.2d 250, 252 (Conn.
1963). See also Mills v. Town Planning and Zoning Commn, 134 A.2d 250
(Conn. 1957).
57 See 12 CALFoRNIA INTnU! Co~minrr BEPoRTs No. 6 (1961-63);
ASSEmBLY INTEm Coinnsrrr= oN GovEPNiwiNr OPERA TON, CONFLICT OF IN-
TERT 18-20 (1964).
58 158 A.2d 722 (N.J. 1960).
59 112 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1957).
60357 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. 1962). Accord, Blankenship v. City of Richmond,
188 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1948).
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fused to invalidate the decision because the connection was "in-
direct and remote." The definition in Section 100.171 should re-
quire an opposite result to be reached in Kentucky and quite
properly so. Coffin illustrates the kind of situation where a plan-
ning commission member will be sorely tempted to vote against
the public interest, and for this reason he should be disqualified
from voting. As in the concept of a credible witness in the law
of wills, the amount of potential gain should be irrelevant.
IV. THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
1. What is Planning
Sections 100.187-.197 constitute one of the most significant
features of the new legislation since they detail with considerable
specificity the planning process which must be undertaken before
cities and counties can regulate the use of land. The long range
purpose of these sections is to force the cities and counties to
rely on planning in the implementation of land use controls.
Planning is a process by which a geographic area's problems are
identified and goals formulated, alternative solutions examined,
and implementation strategies proposed. Planning requires first
the identification of the various sub-systems which constitute the
ecology of the area.6' These include: (1) physiography, (2) struc-
tures, (3) demographic patterns, (4) production and distribution
patterns, (5) consumption patterns, (6) land uses, (7) communi-
cative patterns, (8) urban design, (9) land ownership patterns,
(10) structural organization of the various units of local govern-
ments, (11) accessibility, (12) urban interaction, and (13) land
and improvement values.
Thus, the first stage of the planning process is the collection of
an optimum amount of data. The second stage is the identification
of the problems of an area and the formulation of a series of goals
which should be achieved in their solution. This involves the
threshold decision that it is necessary to intervene in the market
process, followed by a thorough consideration of all alternative ap-
proaches which can be taken to the problem. The third stage
is the formulation of a series of implementation strategies based
on the impact of the proposed solutions on each of the sub-systems.
(6 See Fagin, Planning For Future Urban Growth, 30 LAw & Cowrie,. FRoB.
9 (1965).
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2. Requirement of a Comprehensive Plan
Section 100.183 requires that the planning commission of each
unit prepare a comprehensive plan to serve as a guide for public
and private decisions. The previous planning and enabling legis-
lation spoke of a master plan and a comprehensive plan, but
defined neither. In practice, very little planning was done, and in
most cases only a land use map and supporting studies, basically
descriptive of existing land use and population patterns, were pro-
duced. The city or county legislative bodies were not required to
follow the recommendations of the planning commission which
were characterized by the Court of Appeals as "merely advisory."6 2
3. Minimum Requirements of a Comprehensive Plan
Section 100.187 sets out four minimum requirements for the
comprehensive plan. The first is "a statement of goals and
objectives, principal policies and standards to serve as a guide for
the physical development and economic social well-being of the
planning unit." The second is a land use plan, covering all types
of land use, which shows
proposals for the most appropriate, economic, desirable and
feasible patterns for the general location and character, extent
and interrelationship of the manner in which the community
should use its public and private land at specified times as far
into the future as it is reasonable to foresee.
Thirdly, a transportation plan is required. The fourth require-
ment is a community facilities plan which shows proposals "for
the most desirable, appropriate economic and feasible pattern for
the general location, and character and the extent of public and
semi-public buildings, land and facilities for specified times as far
into the future as it is reasonable to foresee." The statute suggests
that the comprehensive plan contain proposals for community re-
newal, flood and pollution, control conservation, and natural re-
sources, but these elements are not mandatory. The emphasis in
these sections is on location criteria and long range projections.
To insure that the plan does not become merely descriptive of
6 2 The previous enabling legislation for second class cities was much more
liberal. It permitted the commission to grant a map amendment without a showing
of changed conditions or mistake. They merely had to state that they had
changed their minds. Shemwell v. Speck, 265 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. 1954).
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existing community land use patterns and characteristics, Section
100.191 requires that all elements of the comprehensive plan be
based on a specified research process. As far as it is reasonably
possible, the plan must contain: (1) an analysis of the general
distribution characteristics of the past and the present population
and a forecast of the extent and character of future population;
(2) an economic survey and analysis of major existing public and
private business activities and a forecast of future economic levels
or conditions; (3) research and analysis as to the nature, extent,
and adequacy of existing land and building use, transportation,
and community facilities in terms of their general location,
character, and extent; (4) any additional information and research
which the planning commission decides will be useful. Moreover,
Section 100.193 requires the planning commission to prepare a
statement of objectives and principles to be adopted by the legisla-
tive bodies which will act as a guide for the preparation of a
continuing series of plans and implementation aids.
4. Adoption of Plans by Planning Commission
One of the most frequent criticisms of. the land use controls
decision-making process is that planning commissions, which are
generally local lay bodies, ignore the advice of their professional
staffs. In an attempt to focus the planning commission's attention
on the comprehensive plan, Section 100.197 requires that it be
adopted after a public hearing. 3 The elements may be adopted
individually when they are completed or as a whole. A simple
majority of the commission is required for adoption. There is also
a requirement that the comprehensive plan and the commission's
research data be reviewed from time to time in light of social,
economic, technical, and physical advances or changes.
V. THE POWER TO ZONE
1. Zoning Authorized
Section 100.201 authorizes cities and counties which are mem-
bers of a planning unit and have adopted at least the objectives of
63 The Section does not indicate if a public hearing must be held each time
an element of the comprehensive plan is adopted or if only one hearing is re-
quired for all elements. Because the elements will probably be adopted separately,
a separate public hearing for each element should be held to insure maimum
citizen participation in the planning process.
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the land use plan to enact an interim or permanent zoning
ordinance. This section, zoning with the usual police power boiler
plate, also provides:
[Z] oning may be employed to provide for vehicle parking
and loading space as well as to facilitate fire and police pro-
tection, and to prevent the overcrowding of land, blight,
danger, and congestion in the circulation of people and corn-
modities, and the loss of life, health, or property from fire,
flood and other dangers. Zoning may also be employed to
protect airports, 4 highways and other transportation facili-
ties, public facilities, including schools and public grounds,
historical districts, central business districts, natural resources,
and other specific areas of planning units which need special
protection by the planning unit.
Section 100.203 requires both a text and a zoning map, and it
specifies the following mandatory requirement for the contents of
the text:
(1) A text, which shall list the types of zones which may be
used, and the regulations which may be imposed in each zone,
which must be uniform throughout the zone. In addition, the
text shall make provisions for the granting of dimensional
variances, conditional use permits, and for nonconforming
use of land and structures, and any other provisions which
are necessary to implement the zoning regulation. The city
or county may regulate: (a) The activity on the land, in-
64 Control of the land surrounding an airport is shared by the Kentucky Air-
port Zoning Commission and local planning units. The Commission was created in
1960 to preempt partially local control of the land surrounding publicly owned air-
ports. The local planning units still maintain complete control over the lands
surrounding privately owned airports. KRS 183.867 provides that the Commission
shall have exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of land use regulations in all matters
pertaining "to the safe and proper maneuvering of aircraft and the safe and
proper use of the airport involved. The local zoning body may retain jurisdiction
of zoning in such areas as to all other matters." The power to enact airport land
regulations is broader than that given to local units by KRS § 183.750-.758 (1954).
Local units will be restricted to the elimination of safety hazards, and the Court
of Appeals has indicated a willingness to review legislative determinations of the
nexus between the regulation and airport safety. See Banks v. Fayette County
Bd. of Airport Zoning Appeals, 313 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1958). See generally
Note, Airport Zoning and the Land Surrounding It in the let Age, 48 Ky. L. J.
273 (1960).
There is a need to further clarify the division between state and local
jurisdiction. The emphasis in the jet age will increasingly shift from the elimination
of safety hazards to the harmonization of uses of the surrounding area wiht the
airport. More particularly experiments with zoning to decrease noise levels for
the benefit of surrounding suburbanites crowding against airport runways will
increase. KRS 183.687 does not clearly allocate responsibility between the
state and local units for noise prevention.
KENTucKY LAw JouNA[
cluding filling or excavation of land, and the removal of
natural resources, and the use of water courses, and other
bodies of water, as well as land subject to flooding; (b) The
size, width, height, bulk, location of structures, buildings and
signs; (c) Minimum or maximum areas or percentages of
areas, courts, yards, or other open spaces or bodies of water
which are to be left unoccupied, and minimum distance re-
quirements between buildings or other structures; (d) In-
tensity of use and density of population floor area to ground
area ratios, or other means; (e) Districts of special interest
to the proper development of the community, including, but
not limited to, exclusive use districts, historical districts,
planned business districts, planned industrial districts, re-
newal, rehabilitation, and conservation districts; planned
neighborhood and group housing districts; (f) Fringe areas
of each district, by imposing requirements which will make it
compatible with neighboring districts; (g) The activities and
structures on the land at or near major thoroughfares, their
intersections, and interchanges, and transportation arteries,
natural or artificial bodies of water, public buildings and
public grounds, aircraft, helicopter, rocket and spacecraft
facilities, places having unique interest or value, flood plain
areas, and other places having a special character or use
affecting or affected by their surroundings.
2. Enactment of Zoning Regulations
Zoning regulations are passed by the legislative bodies of the
cities and the fiscal courts where the city and county are members
of a joint planning unit. Section 100.207 requires that when a
zoning ordinance is initially enacted, the planning commission
must prepare the text and map of all zoning regulations and hold
at least one public hearing as required by KRS ch. 424. The plan-
ning commission must then submit the proposed ordinance to the
appropriate city legislative bodies and fiscal courts for adoption or
denial. The ultimate authority to pass or reject the zoning rests
with various legislative bodies or fiscal courts, but if they desire
to pass an ordinance which contains "any changes or departures"
from the zoning regulation as proposed by the planning com-
mission, a majority of the entire legislative body or fiscal court
must favor the change. Any proposed changes or departures
initiated by the legislative bodies or the fiscal court must be re-
ferred back to the planning commission for its recommendation.
The use of the sweeping language "any changes or departures" is
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an attempt to restrict the legislative body's discretion to override
the planning commission recommendations, since those recom-
mendations are presumably based on the advice of professional
planners. Section 100.207 seems to apply even to the most minor
wording and technical changes, and while a simple standard to
apply, it may prove to be unduly restrictive.
A major problem from the practitioner's point of view is that
the enabling legislation fails to clearly define the term "zoning
regulation." It is defined in Section 100.111 (17) as "any enact-
ment by the legislative body of the city or county whether it is an
ordinance, resolution or other order and shall include regulations
for the subdivision of land adopted by the planning commission."
A zoning ordinance consists of two parts-a text and a map. The
text lists the use districts, the restrictions imposed, and matters of
local procedure, and the map delineates the location of these
districts within the boundaries of the planning jurisdiction. The
most frequent regulation will be an amendment to the map
ordinance, but it is not clear if the term "regulation" includes
both text and map amendments. Moreover, the legislation appears
somewhat contradictory. Section 100.211 requires that, regardless
of the origin of an amendment to "any zoning regulation," it
must be referred to the planning commission before adoption.
That section is apparently complemented by Section 100.321
which is located in the midst of the sections dealing with sub-
division regulation and official mapping, and requires that any
change in the zoning regulation or official map regulation be
referred to the planning commission before it can be adopted.
This section adds the requirement that the commission must
either approve or disapprove the proposed change within sixty
days after receipt. Both sections provide that a majority of the
entire legislative body or fiscal court is required to override the
recommendation of the planning commission, but it is not clear if
the term "regulation," in these sections, refers to both a text and
a map amendment. Section 100.321 has been held by at least one
trial court to refer only to a text amendment 5 although, ap-
parently, the Legislature, in Section 100.207, has defined a zoning
regulation to include both the text and the map. The Legislature
6 5 Sexton v. Thompson, No. 19480 (Fayette Circuit Ct., Fayette County,
Ky., Nov. 11, 1966).
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should clarify this confusion, but in the absence of corrective
legislation, the courts should construe the term "regulation" as
commonly understood-an amendment including either a text or
a map amendment unless otherwise specified.
3. Standards for Amending a Zoning Ordinance
The amendment procedures have considerably altered the
traditional balance of authority between the planning commission
and the legislative bodies. The commission has been strengthened
at the expense of the city and county legislative bodies. The theory
behind these changes, which are discussed in detail below, is the
necessity to force the local legislative bodies to rely more on the
advice of professional planners. Land use controls have moved
from their original and narrow regulatory objectives to a means of
substantially modifying the environment. For example, objectives
aimed at the control of population densities and prevention of
suburban sprawl now include the establishment of buffer zones in
the central city to prevent the rapid deterioration of an area
through the rapid spread of incompatible uses and the regulation
of the timing of suburban growth. As the objectives have broad-
ened, zoning administration has become increasingly chaotic.60
Decisions have often been made in total disregard of any rational
theory of planning. This lack of a rational planning theory is due
to a variety of reasons ranging from straight-out personal gain on
the part of local "public" officials to less articulated notions such
as the desire not to frighten industry away or the simplistic notion
that any change automatically spells progress. One frequently
reads of a planner charging that a decision to re-zone an area
ruins the twenty-year master plan or that two hundred per cent
more land is zoned for industry than will be needed over the next
twenty-five years. While originally the function of the plan was
advisory only, more recent planning theories have attempted to
control the chaos resulting in making zoning decisions by tying
the legislative body to plans prepared by professional planners.
This provides for, at least, the possibility of a rational basis for
decision-making.
There are two major difficulties with this approach. The first is
that one must still distinguish between the planning commission,
66 See R. BABCOcE, TE ZONmG CGAm 11-16 (1966).
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which is a lay body, and its professional staff. The staff serves in an
advisory capacity only, and frequently the planning commission
disregards its own staff's advice. When this is the case, attempting
to give the planning commission more control over the decision-
making process will not increase the reliance on professional
planning advice. The second difficulty is that often the planning
commission and its staff are not actually engaging in planning to
any meaningful extent but are merely disguising preconceived
value judgments without seriously considering alternative solu-
tions or the justification for attempting to attain the stated goal.
The new enabling legislation strengthens the hand of the planning
commission by allowing a veto over map amendments in certain
situations.
An amendment may originate with a property owner, the
planning commission, or a local legislative body. Section 100.211
requires that any amendment must be referred to the planning
commission before it may be adopted. The same requirement is
contained in Section 100.321. The only difference in the two
sections is that Section 100.211 requires that the planning com-
mission hold a public hearing, while Section 100.321 requires that
the commission approve or disapprove "any change in the zoning
regulation" within sixty days of its receipt. Both sections require
that "a majority of the entire membership of the referring legis-
lative body shall be required to override the disapproval by the
planning commission." As previously mentioned, one trial court
has held that Section 100.321 refers only to a text amendment. It
could be argued that the General Assembly intended to require a
public hearing only in the case of map amendments because the
former are more important and should be publicly discussed. It
seems more rational to assume, however, that the Legislature in-
tended to provide a uniform procedure for all types of amend-
ments to a zoning regulation since both a text and map amend-
ment can have a substantial impact on the comprehensive plan
and the individual property owner. The two sections are confusing
and poorly spaced in the text and should be consolidated and
clarified.
Section 100.213 is the crucial card in the planning commis-
sioner's hand. Its origin has been shrouded in mystery and its
present application is the subject of intense controversy. The key
1968]
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sentence reads: "Before any map amendment is granted, the
planning commission and the legislative body or fiscal court must
find that the map amendment is in agreement with the com-
munity's comprehensive plan, or, in the absence of such a finding,
that one or more of the following apply . . .": (1) The original
zoning classification was inappropriate and improper; (2) There
have been major changes of an economic, physical, or social
nature within the area involved which were not anticipated in the
community's comprehensive plan and which have substantially
altered the basic character of the area. The importance of Section
100.213 lies in the fact that both the commission and the fiscal
court must make the required findings. Thus, Section 100.213
makes the planning commission co-equal with the Legislative body
when a map amendment is sought. The inclusion of the word
"and" is the subject of considerable controversy. It is argued that
the word was carefully chosen, while others maintain that it is a
typographical error and the word "or" was intended. The former
interpretation appears the most rational67 but the section appears
doomed to be amended by the General Assembly.68
This section has already been the subject of litigation in
Fayette County. A large industrial park was proposed outside the
presently designated urban service area adjacent to Interstate 75.
The planning commission found that the amendment would not
be in accordance with the county's land use plan and that neither
of the exceptions in Section 100.213 applied. However, the fiscal
court, to promote industrial growth, made contrary findings. The
Fayette County circuit court ruled that the amendment had not
been adopted because Section 100.213 was to be interpreted
literally, i.e., both sides had to make the same findings.69
The standards set forth in Section 100.213 seem to be taken
from the "change or mistake" rule developed in Maryland. 70 It
67"Inherent in the formulation of planning policy are notions that some
form of suspensive veto over legislative (elective) prerogatives may be ap-
propriate as a device for encouraging the 'long range' view and subvert "short
range political expedients." Henrickson, State Enabling Legislation, 1964 PLAN-
NiNG 215, 216-17 (1964).
6SLegislation has been introduced in the 1968 Kentucky General As-
semblv to provide that a mao amendment may be granted if only the legislative
body makes the required findings. S.B. 97, 1968 Ky. General Assembly.6 9 Sexton v. Thompson, No. 19480 (Fayette Circuit Ct., Fayette County,
Ky., Nov. 11, 1966).7o See Note, Validity of a Rezoning Ordinance in Maryland, 13 MD. L. E v.
242 (1953).
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could be argued that they are too rigid and thus fail to give de-
cision-making bodies the flexibility necessary to accommodate new
use demands. However, this author believes that greater rigidity
and less flexibility is needed if the comprehensive plan is to serve
as a meaningful guide for the planning unit's zoning policy. It is
necessary to limit the discretion of the commission and local
legislative body in order to force the commission to view the plan
as establishing the structure for future zoning decisions. The
planning unit still remains free to amend the plan and thus
justify the map amendment. But, more public scrutiny may be
brought to bear on a proposed amendment to the comprehensive
plan than on a single map amendment; thus, there is a greater
chance that the integrity of the plan will be preserved.
Perhaps the General Assembly should eliminate the planning
commission. Citizen bodies attempting to make decisions which
require expertise beyond that of most of its members have recently
come under more frequent attack. One recent writer concludes:
"It has become clear that the planning commission concept has
failed to produce good local planning; it has led to a subversion
of the public interest." 71 He proposes that the local legislative
body establish a set of standards to be administered by a pro-
fessional staff. This remedy finds support in Babcock's recent ex-
pos6, The Zoning Game. Babcock, a lawyer, recommends this
route because "The professional, in planning or politics, has our
respect, if not always our sympathy. We know what his bench-
marks are likely to be. We understand the risks he must constantly
weigh, the alternatives he must balance. He may disagree with us
and defeat us, but generally we know why we were rejected. The
same cannot be said of the inscrutable commissioners in their role
as decisionmakers.' '72 The spectre of a zoning czar may initially
repel most lawyers and developers, but the idea should be con-
sidered as a realistic alternative to the present state of chaos. Per-
haps this proposal would tend to insure greater public partici-
pation in the planning process for which the planners are always
crying. If interested elements of the community knew that the
comprehensive plan would definitely serve as a guide for future
71 Wood, Let's Abolish the Planning Commission, Cay CAxaroiwx 15 (1967).
72 R. BABcocn, THE ZoNnM GAmE 40 (1966).
KmETucKy LAw JomuN[o
land use decisions, they might debate and study the plan prior to
adoption much more intensively than is now the case.
4. The Use of the Comprehensive Plan as a New Standard for
Judicial Review.
The statute is relatively clear on the planning process to be
followed, but it is evasive about the consequences of failure to
follow the comprehensive plan when regulations are enacted
pursuant to it. The statute and decisions of the Court of Appeals
would seem to indicate that, at present, the consequences are
minimal. First, Section 100.201 permits a city to enact a permanent
zoning ordinance after adoption of only the objectives of the com-
prehensive plan. 3There is no requirement that the remaining
required elements be completed except that Sections 100.277 and
.293 forbid the adoption of subdivision regulations and an official
map unless the required elements of the comprehensive plan have
been completed and adopted by the planning commission. This
will prove a practical sanction to compel completion and adoption
of the plan in most cases. However, Section 100.207 should be
amended to permit only interim zoning prior to completion of the
required elements of the comprehensive plan; otherwise, Section
100.207 renders Section 100.187 theoretically worthless. Section
100.197 contains a requirement that the elements be reviewed at
least once every five years and then renders this meaningless by pro-
viding "but no comprehensive plan shall be declared invalid on
the grounds that the review was not performed."
Courts have long been urged to enforce the requirement that
zoning be in accordance with the comprehensive planJ 4 Originally,
the comprehensive plan was to serve only as a private guide for the
planning commission. The plan was not to be adopted and the
planning commission was to have no obligation to use it as a basis
73 KRS § 100.201 (1966) permits the adoption of an interim ordinance. If an
interim ordinance is allowed to expire prior to the passage of a permanent
ordinance, the ordinance is considered repealed. Higdon v. Campbell County
Fiscal Ct., 374 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1964) (trailer park permitted after expiration of
interim ordinance).
74 See Haar, In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan, 68 HanV. L. EEv.
1154 (1955). Considerable confusion still exists between the meaning of compre-
hensive planning and comprehensive zoning. The Supreme Court of Washington
recently held after extensive citation to Professor Haar's article that while a
comprehensive zoning ordinance was required, a comprehensive plan was not a
pre-condition to the enactment of r valid zoning ordinance. Shelton v. City of
Bellevue, 435 P.2d 949 (Wash. 1968).
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for recommending zoning and other land use regulations.75
Sections 100.187-.197 contemplate that the comprehensive plan
will be considerably more than advisory, if the planning com-
mission elects to adopt it in whole or in part. For example, if the
planning commission adopts the land use plan element, the plan
becomes the basis for all future decisions to deny or grant a map
amendment. The property owner desiring the map amendment
must prove that one of two conditions exist: (1) the proposed use
is contemplated in the land use plan element; or, (2) the plan is
inapplicable because of either of the two factors specified in
Section 100.213. If neither of these conditions exist, the planning
commission must deny the map amendment. The plan will still
remain advisory in practice, however, because Section 100.213
gives the commission wide latitude in granting map amendments,
but over the long run the plan should provide a more rational
structure for decision-making.
Planning theory specifies that studies are to be prepared for
legislative adoption. They will then provide the basis for defining
the public interest as applied to a series of the land use decisions
proposed by the private sector. In short, land use controls will be
used to implement a series of rational public decisions. Rather
than endless study, action is the object of the comprehensive plan.
Kentucky's new planning act meets the first requirement. Sections
100.183 and .197 incorporate the theory that plans are to be pre-
pared for legislative adoption, although there does not appear to
be a formal sanction for failure to adopt the plans. The most im-
portant question is, however, will the definition of the compre-
hensive plan contained in Sections 100.187, .191, and .193 produce
the kind of plans which can be adapted to the above idealized
model of the decision-making process. Based on a reading of the
comprehensive plan for Lexington-Fayette County, the answer is
probably not. The plans adopted by the City-County Planning
Commission are an excellent example of what Constance Perin has
labeled obsessive planning.76 The plans endlessly digest data and
seldom come to a conclusion. The comprehensive plan consists of
some twenty-three reports. Aside from containing pages of data,
76i See Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 353, 364 (1955).
76 Perin, The Noiseless Secession From the Comprehensive Plan, 33 A.I.P.J.
336 (1967).
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the comprehensive plan proposes criteria for the location of
regional shopping centers77 and informs local residents that in
1965 only 48.2 per cent of the airline passengers flying in and out
of Lexington used the local airport instead of those in Louisville
and Cincinnati. 78 This means that Lexington needs more direct
flights to New York, Chicago, and St. Louis. The range of topics
covered by the plan means that courts will have little inclination
to look to it as a standard for reviewing zoning and other planning
decisions. If the plans are to serve as a standard, the lawyer must
take the initiative and winnow through the plans to apply them
to his client's property. If this is not done, statutory requirements
for a comprehensive plan will only result in a stack of designs to
dress up planning commission waiting rooms.
There is a compelling need for the Court to formulate new
standards of judicial review for zoning and other planning
decisions. Planners and lawyers are often operating in a legal
vacuum because judicial participation has been minimal. There
is increasing controversy about the purposes for which zoning can
be used. Increasing dissatisfaction exists among lawyers and
developers because the lack of standards to guide planning com-
missions and local legislative bodies turns the decision-making
process into a series of incomprehensible ad hoc decisions.79 The
public interest is never clearly defined and thus it becomes in-
creasingly difficult, not to say unfair, to ask the property owner
to forego profitable alternatives in the name of the public good.
The courts incant constantly that decisions cannot be arbitrarily
or capriciously made, but all they mean is that the litigant has a
right to procedural due process. A litigant may be treated irra-
tionally as long as it is done with style. The few substantive consti-
tutional standards which the courts have devised, such as spot
zoning, only begin to confront the problems. The failure of the
judiciary to participate more actively in the process contributes to
a vicious circle. Decisions which should be substantively reviewed
are not; disrespect for land planning is generated, and the com-
77 See Crry-CouNTY PLANNING ComisSsON, LEXINGTON-FAYE=rE CoUNTY,
KmErucxy, A PLAN FOR Lkm USE 91-92 (1966).
7/8 See CrrY-CoUNTY PLANNING ComRiIssIoN, IrUqGToN-FAyETrE Cowry,
KENTUCKY, AmR TRANSPORTATION IN FAYETTE CouNrY, Ky. (1967).
79See Michalski, Zoning-The National Peril, 1963 PLANNING 62; Hagiman,
supra note 45, at 475.
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munity emerges the loser because of the increased difficulty in
using zoning to promote the rational development of the com-
munity. Those courts which continue to invoke the doctrine of
separation of powers and pretend that zoning is always rational
are simply unwilling to face the fact that in a significant number
of instances, zoning has gotten out of hand and needs to be checked
more carefully than it has been in the past. This is not a plea for
a return to the selective substantive review which characterized
pre-New Deal judicial review, nor does it imply that utter chaos
prevails. It is simply a recognition that many of the important
questions about the use of zoning are not being analyzed by the
courts to provide the necessary guidelines for those engaged in
planning and zoning.
The Court of Appeals can break the circle by using the
comprehensive plan as a standard to test the validity of important
land use planning decisions.8 0 The Court must make the following
inquiries:
(1) What are the value assumptions behind the compre-
hensive plan? There is a need to begin to separate the real from the
illusory. Planners, planning commissioners, and cities are be-
coming increasingly sophisticated in packaging important social
and economic values in traditional, soothing planning language.
The courts must match this process by defining with more pre-
cision the relevant issues at stake. For example, an ordinance which
bans all drive-up businesses from suburban downtown areas in-
volves other considerations than traffic circulation. It is up to the
Court to discover and point these out.
(2) What is the scope and purpose of the zoning power? New
constitutional standards must be formulated and more precise
interpretations of statutory definitions of the zoning power must
be made. For example, the Court must decide if the exclusion of
an activity by county A raises equal protection problems if it is
permitted in county B. It must decide if Section 100.201 which
provides that zoning can be used to protect the central business
district, means that a map amendment for a regional shopping
center can be denied to exclude suburban competitors.
80 See Bernard, The Comprehensive Plan as A Basis For Legal Reform, 44
J. UBBAN L. 611, 622-24 (1967).
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(8) Are the criteria employed in the comprehensive plan a
reasonable method of achieving the goals of the plan? The role of
the Court in making the inquiry will be limited, but it should
have the salutory impact on the planning process of forcing
planners to think in terms of specific programs and methods of
implementing broad objectives.
(4) Was a given decision based on the criteria set forth in the
adopted plan for the location of the use? This is the crux of the
Court's power to set new standards. If the plan is prepared for
adoption by legislative bodies, it should be followed by them. This
inquiry cannot be overly rigid because the primary decision about
how the criteria should be formulated properly rests with the local
legislatures. It can, however, serve to curb clear cases of abuse and
thus minimize irrational decisions. By focusing on the criteria
employed in the plan, the Court can begin to structure the plan-
ning decision-making process by confining the participants to dis-
cussion of the relevant issues.
Has the Court of Appeals done this? Not really, but they
should. The Court made a brilliant start in Fritts v. City of Ash-
lands' in 1960. Prior to Fritts, the Court virtually refused to review
planning decisions except where there was a taking of property
without just compensation,32 a violation of the applicant's right
81348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. 1961). Fritts was followed and amplified in Hodge
v. Luckett, 357 S.W.2d 303 (Ky. 1962). There, 18/2 acres were rezoned from
residential to light industrial. The tract was surrounded by residentially zoned
property but the decision was supported because of special drainage problems.
The trial court upheld the classification, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The
Court listed three conditions which must be met in order for rezoning which
would ordinarily be struck down as spot zoning to be valid: (1) there must be
substantial change in the vicinity, (2) the rezoning must be pursuant to the citys
comprehensive plan, or (3) the rezoning must reflect a difference between the
tract and the surrounding property. The first two were found to be inapplicable and
the third was also found inapplicable for the following reasons:
Under the rule we have here announced, where the sole basis for change
is that the property is different in condition or character from the sur-
rounding property in the same zoning classification, a finding to the
effect that a rezoning would promote the welfare of the community as
a whole . . . must be supported by evidence not only proving the dif-
ference in situation, but also negating in clear and convincing fashion
the probability of substantial resulting detriment to other property likely
to be affected. In this case there was no substantial proof to the latter
effect; on the contrary, from the evidence introduced there is very little
doubt that the residential property in the community would be adversely
affected, and probably to a material degree. Id. at 306.82 See, e.q., The Hamilton Co. v. Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and
Zoning Comm n, 287 S.W.2d 434 (Ky. 1955).
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to procedural due process,83 or a flagrant case of spot zoning.8 4 The
Court generally deferred to the judgment of the local legislative
body and would not be classified as a restrictive court.8 5 Fritts can
be properly characterized as a spot zoning case, but the Court's
opinion went beyond the traditional equal protection rationale
and began to trace a link between planning and its implementa-
tion through zoning. The applicant in Fritts secured a map amend-
ment for a four acre tract from residential to light industrial by
threatening to leave the city if it was not granted. In reversing, the
Court found that the amendment had no relation to the city's
current or projected land use plan and thus was invalid. The
following guidelines were laid down for future decisions:
We feel impelled to express briefly our view of the
proper theory of zoning as it relates to the making of changes
in an original comprehensive ordinance. We think the theory
is that after the enactment of the original ordinance there
should be a continuous or periodic study of the development
of property uses, the nature of population trends, and the
commercial and industrial growth, both actual and pro-
spective. On the basis of such study changes may be made
intelligently, systematically, and according to a coordinated
plan designed to promote zoning objectives. An examination
of the multitude of zoning cases that have reached this court
leads us to the conclusion that the common practice of zoning
83 See, e.g., City of Somerset v. Weise, 263 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1954) (zoning
ordinance enacted prior to appointment of zoning commission void).
s4 Spot zoning was originally used to curb clear cases of special interest
legislation where a single lot received a benefit wbich was not related to thegeneral welfare of the community and detrimental to those residing around the
rezoned area. A typical case is Polk v. Axton, 806 Ky. 498, 208 S.W.2d 497 (1948).
Defendant owned a lot in an area zoned for duplexes which he succeeded in
having rezoned to allow a four unit apartment house. The Court invalidated the
rezoning because it was found to benefit only the individual property owner and
not the general public. See also Parker v. Rash, 286 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1951). The
Court extended its analysis of spot zoning to larger tracts in Mathis v. Hannan,
306 S.W.2d 278 (Ky. 1956).
The force of the prohibition of spot zoning has declined as the use of
planning has increased. Courts are tending to defer to the judgment of local
legislative bodies even in the case of the rezoning of a single lot, if it allegedly was
done in accordance with a comprehensive plan, regardless of whether it in fact
was. See, e.g., Penn v. Metropolitan Plan. Comm'n of Marion County, 228 N.E.2d
2.5 (Ind. 1967); Ellicott v. Mayor & City of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d
649 (1942).
86 See, e.g., Byrn v. Beachwood Village, 253 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1952) (city
can create buffer zones between commercial and single family residential areas);
City of Richlawn v. McMaldn, 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 945 (1951) (ordinance for sixth class city in the suburbs of
Louisville which provided for only two zones-agricultural and residential-was
valid). See also Fried v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning Commn, 258
S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953).
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agencies, after the adoption of an original ordinance, is
simply to wait until some property owner finds an opportunity
to acquire a financial advantage by devoting his property
to a use other than that for which it is zoned, and then strug-
gle with the question of whether some excuse can be found
for complying with his request for a rezoning. The result has
been that in most of the re-zoning cases reaching the courts
there actually has been spot zoning and the courts have up-
held or invalidated the change according to how flagrant the
violation of true zoning principles has been. It is to be hoped
that in the future zoning authorities will give recognition to
the fact that an essential feature of zoning is planning.86
The Court recently had occasion to further define the relation-
ship between planning and zoning. In Ward v. Knippenberg,s7 a
case which was dearly not a spot zoning problem, it was argued
that a map amendment was inconsistent with the city's compre-
hensive plan. Property was purchased in 1958 for a shopping
center because the community plan at that time specified that the
property was reserved for a shopping center. In 1962, the plan was
amended and the shopping center for that area was put in a dif-
ferent location. In 1966, a map amendment for a shopping center
was granted for the 1958 location. The Court rejected the argu-
ment of neighboring property owners that the re-zoning was not
in accordance with a comprehensive plan. The Court showed little
concern for the comprehensive plan:
With respect to the first proposition, it seems clear that a
zoning agency is not bound to follow every detail of a land use
plan. As we understand it, such a plan is simply a basic
scheme generally outlining planning and zoning objectives
in an extensive area. It is in no sense a final plan and is con-
tinually subject to modification in the light of actual land use
development. It serves as a guide rather than a strait-jacket.
In fact the Commission recommended, and the Fiscal Court
8 6 Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712, 714-15 (Ky. 1961). The
comprehensive plan has been used as a basis to deny a map amendment in a
major unreported circuit court case in Lexington, Kentucky. The City-County
Planning Commission adopted a land use plan which attempted to control the
timing and location of suburban development by dividing the city and county into
two service districts. The purpose of the two districts was to preserve the horse
farms which serve as a natural greenbelt around the city. The Planning Com-
mission denied a map amendment for high density residential development of a
farm which lay in both districts. The circuit court upheld the denial because the
action was in furtherance of the commission's adopted plan. Provincial Dev. Co.
v. Webb, No. 7973 (Fayette Circuit Court, Fayette County, ICy., Jan. 3, 1961).
87 416 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1967).
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adopted the shopping center location in exactly the same spot
where it was shown on the 1958 land use plan. We know of no
reason why the Commission could not, in the light of the
latest developments, decide which of two different locations
in the same subdivision area would best serve immediate re-
quirements.8 8
It was alleged that another shopping center was only 1,500
feet away, but the Court concluded that this "is not in itself
sufficient to indicate arbitrary action." The Court incorrectly
framed the issue, for it should have examined the location
criteria and, if found reasonable, determined whether they had
been followed in this case. The disturbing aspect of this opinion
is not its result but the Court's reluctance to examine the re-
lationship between the plan and the map amendment. The Court
did not have to abolish the comprehensive plan as it appears to
have done. It is correct in saying that the location should have been
determined by the planning commission, but the function of the
Court should be to examine in detail the criteria the plan formu-
lates for the location of these types of shopping centers to decide
if the decision was in accord with the adopted criteria. The plan
will generally contain location criteria such as: (1) the area should
not abut similar commercial concentrations; and (2) neighbor-
hood shopping centers should be located centrally within the
residential neighborhood which they serve. If the comprehensive
plan is adopted, the inquiries cease to be ones of reasonableness
based on general theories of proper location, as in this case,
and become inquiries based on the reasonableness of the location
with regard to the specific criteria adopted by the planning com-
mission.
5. Special Uses of Zoning
The Kentucky Court of Appeals held zoning constitutional in
192889 and did not greatly interfere with the process as long as it
was restricted to the simple function of segregating incompatible
uses. But, as the use of zoning shifted from an essentially negative
to a positive function, the Court became less receptive to new
88 I& at 748.89 Fowler v. Obier, 224 Ky. 742, 7 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1928).
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forms of zoning. The failure to recognize new uses of zoning has
made planners and cities hesitant to try to encourage the use of
new concepts because of doubt as to their validity. Sections 100.201
and .203 are designed to encourage the use of more imaginative
forms of zoning by expressly authorizing a variety of relatively
new concepts. Planned unit developments and historic zones merit
special attention.
Section 100.203 (1) (e) gives the planning unit the opportunity
to experiment with new forms of zoning, including exclusive use
districts. The section reverses Pierson Trapp Co. v. Peak, 0 which
invalidated a planned shopping center district on the grounds that
the previous enabling legislation did not permit the creation of
single use districts. This decision cast doubt on Court approval
of a number of new zoning concepts.
(a) Planned Unit Developments-There has been much recent
dissatisfaction with the quality of design and site planning pro-
duced by Euclidean zoning. Rather than relying on the grid pat-
tern produced by the usual height, bulk, and setback requirements,
planned unit development ordinances seek to encourage archi-
tectural innovation and a higher level of amenity by massing
densities and open space patterns.91 The new enabling legislation
appears to authorize planned unit development ordinances but
leaves their content entirely up to individual planning units.
Section 100.203 (1) (c) and (d) permit the unit to locate structures
with regard to living space, open space, and recreation space
ratios. Section 100.203 (1) (e) permits the location of planned
neighborhood and group housing districts, making explicit what
was implied in Section 100.203 (1) (e) and (d). The planning unit
has been expressly given three important powers which are neces-
sary to implement planned unit developments: (1) it may require
a development plan as a condition precedent to a map amend-
90 340 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Ky. 1960).
91 See Symposium, Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L. RExv. 3 (1965).92 In Central Kentucky Dev. Co. v. Knippenberg, 416 S.W.2d 745 (Ky. 1967),
it was argued that the planning commission could not require a development
plan because it would constitute an unauthorized use of contract or conditional
zoning. The Court refused to pass on this issue and held only that the commission
had the power to require a development plan under former KRS § 100.350
(1958).
Most jurisdictions except New York originally held contract or conditional
zoning invalid. See cases cited in Sylvania Elec. Prod. Co. v. City of Newtovn,
(Continued on next page)
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ment;02 (2) Section 100.281 (1) permits the unit to adopt a pro-
cedure for preliminary approval of subdivision plots, enabling the
developer to obtain some form of assurance from the city that his
project will be approved in the early stages of financing and pro-
motion; (3) Section 100.281 (4) allows the unit to require sub-
division performance bonds in order to insure the proper com-
pletion of physical improvements. Despite these sections there is
still confusion in Section 100.203. Subsection (1) reiterates the
traditional requirement that the regulations imposed must be
uniform throughout the zone. The purpose of planned unit
development is to permit departures from the rigid requirements
of uniformity, according to standards administered by the plan-
ning commission. Proposed state planned unit enabling legislation
expressly abrogates the requirement of uniformity, 93 but this was
not incorporated into the revision of Chapter 100. The Court
need not wait for legislation to clarify this ambiguity in order to
validate a planned unit ordinance, for it could find that sub-
sections (c)- (e) expressly supercede the uniformity requirement or
that the requirement is satisfied because the standards are uniform
although their application to the individual developer may vary.
The planning unit may require a development plan as a condi-
tion precedent to granting any map amendment under Section
100.203 (2). The unit may also require that "substantial con-
struction" be initiated within one year after the permit is granted.
However, the planning unit must hold a public hearing before
the zoning change reverts to its original designation. The fact
that a development plan can be required with any request for a
map amendment gives the planning commission power to dis-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
344 Mass. 428, 18, N.E. 2d 118 (1962). Recent cases have abandoned their
former rigid attitude and have begun to evaluate the particular situation and
restrictions imposed in light of their contribution toward implementation of the
comprehensive plan. In Sylvania Electric, .supra, at 122, the court approached the
problem indirectly by upholding a concession extractd by the city in return for
a map amendment because they were "the induced, voluntary action of Sylvania,
not the vote of the council." The moral is bargain in chambers. A more forthright
approach was taken in Hudson Oil Co. v. City of Wichita, 193 Kan. 623, 396
P.2d 271 (1984) where the court held that a requirement that revised sub-
division plat must be filed as a precondition to receipt of a map amendment was
reasonable. See also State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 422 P.2d 790 (Wash.
1967). See generally Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. RBv. 121 (1963).
93 See Babcock, Kransnowiecki & McBride, The Model State Statute, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 140 (1965).
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courage zoning changes, since the cost of its preparation will deter
many small property owners from seeking a zoning change. In ad-
dition, the normal procedure of staff review may unduly prolong
the time needed by the applicant to obtain a commission determi-
nation. Such a broad grant of power may have introduced un-
necessary rigidity into zoning procedure. While a development
plan should be required for major new developments, it does not
seem necessary for minor adjustments of the zoning map. The
objectives of Section 100.203 (2) could be achieved if an acreage
limitation were imposed as a condition precedent to the require-
ment of a development plan.
(b) Preservation of Historic Areas-Special use districts may
be established "to protect ... historical districts ... ."4 The power
to create historic districts will be useful to many towns in Kentucky
whose history dates from the end of the eighteenth century and
which are interested in preserving areas containing outstanding
examples of the various types of pre-Civil War architecture. The
Lexington zoning ordinance is illustrative of one method of
historic district zoning. 5
Historic zoning originated, and is still most widely used, in
areas such as Nantucket, old Charleston, old Santa Fe, and the
Vieux Carre in New Orleans whose economies, in large part, are
based on the camera-clutching tourist desperately trying to capture
forever the image of bygone eras. These ordinances have been
justified on the ground that they are merely performing their
94 The Court of Appeals has never directly passed on the validity of historic
zoning but strong support for its validity can be found in Moore v. Ward, 377
S.W.YA 881 (Ky. 1964) in which the Court held that "promotion of scenic
beauty" was a relevant factor for the Legislature to consider in passing a bill board
control law. The Court, however, still preferred to mix aesthetic considerations
with more traditional justifications such as highway safety. Equally important is
Jasper v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1964) which held that a junk
yard control act whose principal objective was the promotion of aesthetics was
constitutional. See generally J. MosusoN, HISTORIc PEivA-T ION LAW (1957).95 An old and historic district may be superimposed on an existing district.
No exterior alteration or demolition of a building within the district can be under-
taken until a certificate of appropriateness has been obtained from a board of
architectural review. If the hoard refuses to issue a certificate, the applicant may
appeal to the planning commission. The board is limited to exterior considerations
as its function is to insure that the work proposal is not "obviously incongruous
to the old historic aspects of the surroundings." ExIGToN, Ky., ORDM NAcE 20-58
(1965). The constitutional validity of this standard is discussed in Note, The
Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63
COLUm. L. REv. 708, 717-21 (1963).
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traditional function, i.e., protecting property values.96 Today, how-
ever, much historic preservation is justified on such intangible
grounds as the necessity of preserving a link with a past heritage.
97
Many proponents of preservation are reluctant to face the
economic issues. Yet if historic preservation is to be consti-
tutionally sanctionec. and achieve permanent results, "economi-
cally feasible uses must be found for most noteworthy old struc-
tures."' s There is a limit to the number of mini-museums a city
can support as there are only so many compulsive museum-goers.
The most difficult question under the historic zoning ordinance
is the constitutionality of the power to prohibit the demolition of
a building. The Lexington ordinance provides that if the board
recommends disapproval of a permit to demolish the building the
planning commission may refuse to issue the permit. After a six
month period "the permit may be issued by the Zoning Enforce-
ment Officer, provided that the application meets the requirements
of other sections of this Ordinance-Resolution." This is a variant
of the Richmond, Virginia, historic district ordinance which pro-
vides that if the permit is denied, the city shall have six months
to determine if it wishes to acquire the structure by eminent
domain or purchase. The Lexington ordinance does not clearly
specify that issuance of the permit is mandatory after the six month
period has expired, although it could be so construed. If the
ordinance is not construed to make issuance of a permit manda-
9 6 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559
(1941). See Dukeminier, Zoning For Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20
LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 218 (1955).
97 For a discussion of the recent cases involving aesthetics and the police
power, see Fonoroff, Proposed Legislation For Highway Corridor Protection, 1
URBAN LAw ANNuAL 128 (1968).
9 8 DEP M 'r OF Crry PLANNIN, PRESERVING NoRFox's HE AGE, PRO-
POSED ZONING FOR HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL CONSERVATION (City of Norfolk,
Va. 1965). Most planning for historic preservation has failed to answer this hard
question. For example, the LExINGToN-FAyE-rrE COUNTY Crry-CoUNr PLANNING
CoM nssoN, DESIGN PLAN For DowNrowN (19 ), in discussing the "near north
side" which is Lexington's oldest section and contains a number of fine old houses
in a variety of architectural styles, notes only that "[T]his area has been the
residence of many leaders of Lexington and the Blue Grass area. In recent years,
however, many other prestige locations for fine homes have become popular
in the city and county." Nonetheless with no further analysis of the type of
personality which will seek housing in this district, the demand for this type ofhousing, the quality of public schools in the area, the Commission concludes, "the
general concept of planning proposals assumes that there is now and will continue
to be a need for fine homes and apartments near the downtown area." No other
alternative uses of the property are considered.
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tory, this is an excellent case for an application of Dunham's
theory that the property owner is being compelled to confer a
benefit on the public for which he should be compensated 9  This
section therefore should be declared unconstitutional.
VI. ELIMINATION OF NONCONFORMITIES
1. The Power to Eliminate
According to the principles of Euclidean zoning, the noncon-
forming use was to wither away.'00 Instead, the opposite has
occurred, and we now have deteriorating buildings which cannot
be expanded or renovated and which contribute to the spread of
urban blight whenever the owner refuses to move or lacks suf-
ficient capital to salvage the structures. 01 Thus, the noncon-
forming use continues to flourish as a legally protected monopoly.
The sad fact is that zoning arrived too late to contribute signi-
ficantly to the improvement of the city core. In light of this, the
General Assembly had a number of alternatives in drafting a new
nonconforming use section. It could have attempted to work with-
in the Euclidean framework by giving the cities constitutionally
sanctioned powers to eliminate nonconforming uses. It could
have abandoned reliance on the Euclidean concept that cate-
gories of uses are incompatible per se and directed cities to
formulate performance standards which can be used to determine
incompatible uses102 or it could have, as it did, merely patched up
99 Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis For City Planning, 58 COLIMI. L.
REv. 650 (1958). It has been suggested that prohibiting demolition can be
justified under the Dunham theory if the building proposed to be razed forms
such an integral part of the "charm' of an area that surrounding property
values will be adversely affected. Note, supra note 95, at 720-21. This reasoning
might apply to the center of a city whose economic base rests on its quaintness
and charm, but it should not be applied to historic areas being preserved for more
intangible reasons. There is some evidence that courts will look at the purpose of
the historic preservation in setting the limits of the police power. For example,
New York upheld a law which forbids exterior alterations or demolition of build-
ings designated as historic landmarks as long as the owner is guaranteed a reason-
able return on his property. Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n of
New York, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
100 J. METZENBAUM, ZoNiNr 238 (1930).
10 Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAw &
CONTiNW. PROB. 305, 308 (1955).
102 Performance standards attempt to quantify the extent of permissible inter-
ference with the enjoyment of surrounding property. For example, noise levels
might be fixed in terms of permissible decibels and pitch in relation to the
location of the noise-production use. See Progress in Performance Standards for
(Continued on next page)
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the old statute, tightened it a little, and generally failed to come
to grips with the problems caused by the persistence of the non-
conforming use.
The nonconforming use has had a varied history in Ken-
tucky.103 Prior to 1948, the Court of Appeals tried to consistently
follow the policy that survival of the nonconforming use should
be discouraged. However, in 1948, the General Assembly made it
extremely difficult to eliminate a nonconforming use by providing
that it could be changed to a use within the same or more re-
strictive classification and that it could be extended, altered, and
reconstructed. The Court of Appeals had no choice but to follow
suit.
0 4
Section 100.253 now provides that a use existing at the time of
the adoption of the zoning ordinance may continue except under
the following circumstances: 1) the Board of Adjustment may not
permit the extension of a nonconforming use beyond the scope
and area of its operation at the time the ordinance made its use
nonconforming. 01 (Thus, the previous law has been strengthened
by prohibiting the right to extend the nonconforming use, con-
sequently forcing the owner who wishes to expand his use to re-
locate in the district where the use would be permitted.) 2) The
use of the property may be changed only if the new use is in the
same or a more restrictive classification. Most states prohibit any
change, but Kentucky retains the previous exception.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Zoning, 1954 PLANNING 160-70. See generally Bair, Is Zoning A Mistake?:
Thoughts on Performance Standards for Non-Euclidian Non-Zoning, 14 ZoNIr
DIGEsr 249 (1962); Salzenstein, Industrial Performance Standards: Do They
Work? 14 ZONING DxGEST 73 (1962).
103 See Note, Elimination of the Nonconforming Use in Kentucky, 49 Ky.
L. J. 142 (1960).
104 Id. at 148-51. See Butlet v. Louisville and Jefferson County Bd. of Ad-
justment and Appeals, 311 Ky. 663, 224 S.W.2d 658 (1949).
105 A frequently litigated problem is the attempted expansion of the use of
a lot which is only partially occupied at the time the ordinance is adopted. The
leading case is Franklin Planning and Zoning Commn v. Simpson County Lumber
Co., 394 S.W.2d 593 (Ky. 1965). Plaintiff used his lot for storing bricks and
lumber prior to the passage of the ordinance which classified the property as
residential. After passage of the ordinance he graded the back portion o his lot
and used it to store logs. Photographs indicated that the logs were stacked higher
than the bricks but the Court upheld the chancellor's finding that there was
no expansion of a nonconforming use because it could not be said the logs were
"unsightly, obnoxious, or a health hazard." See also Sillman v. Falls City Stone
Co., 305 S.W.2d 322 (Ky. 1957). C1f. Township of Commerce v. Rayburb, 147
N.W.2d 453 (Mich. 1967) (junk yard restricted to portion of lot used prior to the
passage of the ordinance). Contra, Worthington v. Everson, 226 N.E.2d 570
(Ohio 1967).
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2. Change and Expansion of Use
The legislation does not define the "same or a more restrictive"
classification. The Court of Appeals has interpreted it to mean
that a use may be changed to any other use which is no more
objectionable in the degree of nonconformity than the previous
use. Objectionability, apparently, is a mixed conclusion of law
and fact and thus will be determined by the Court-presumably
on the traditional hierarchy of preferred uses running from the
traditional single family bastion to heavy industry. In Smith v.
Howard,10 decided in 1966, the Court of Appeals held that a
change from a plumbing and tractor business to screw manu-
facturing was a permissible change, and indicated that Section
100.253 gives the property owner considerable flexibility in
changing the character of his nonconforming use. If Kentucky is
serious about eliminating nonconforming uses, this provision
should be amended to prohibit change of use.
Most zoning ordinances provide that the nonconforming use
must be terminated if it is discontinued for a period of time-
generally one year. The new enabling legislation does not autho-
rize this procedure, but the Court of Appeals has never invalidated
these ordinance provisions. Thus, it can be assumed that the
power to require termination upon discontinuance is implied in
Section 100.253. Analogizing from the common law concept, the
Court has required an abandonment of the premises. In Attorney
General v. Johnson,07 the Court found an abandonment when a
nonconforming grocery store was leased for four years to the
University of Kentucky Newman Club, reasoning that the intent
to abandon could be implied from "a considerable lapse of time
in the discontinuance of the use. .. ."108 However, the Court's
hard line against continuance of nonconforming uses has been
softened in other cases by its definitions of intent. In Smith v.
Howard, 109 the Court held that discontinuance for the period
specified in the ordinance did not constitute an abandonment
because the nonuse resulted from the owner's inability to lease
106 407 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1966). Compare City of Bowling Green v. Miller,
335 S.W.2d 893 (Ky. 1960) (change from furnace storage to plumbing and sheet
metal business prohibited).
lo7 355 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1962).
108 Id. at 308.
109 407 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1966).
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the property. The Court held that since the owner exercised
"due diligence to lease his property," there was no abandonment
because intent had not been shown. The two cases can be dis-
tinguished on the basis of voluntary versus involuntary abandon-
ment. But, as long as the owner subjectively intends to continue
the use and makes some effort to do so, the standard followed in
Smith will make it difficult to terminate a nonconforming use
even if the cessation lasts beyond the period permitted in the
ordinance.
3. Suggestions for Further Reform
The most controversial proposal for the elimination of non-
conforming uses is amortization. Solicitous for the property owner,
the General Assembly has foreclosed this alternative to Kentucky
planning units. The pros and cons of this technique as well as its
administration have been extensively discussed by the commenta-
tors and will not be covered here. The constitutionality of amorti-
zation was upheld in the leading case of City of Los Angeles v.
Gage,"0 which has been followed by most courts that have con-
sidered the problem."1 The question raised by Section 100.253 is
whether the state or the local planning unit should make the
decision to use amortization. The choice should be left to the
local planning unit instead of being foreclosed by the state. The
enabling legislation should give the units of local government
maximum choice in choosing techniques to implement land
planning policy decisions in order to encourage the cities and
counties to take the initiative to formulate imaginative programs
for the improvement of the physical environment.
110 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954). Kentucky's first class cities had
this power between 1942 and 1948, but the Court of Appeals did not pass on its
constitutionality. KRS § 100.071 (1942). Precedent for the restoration of this
power might be found in a 1785 Lexington ordinance which provided "all
persons having cabins, cow pens, hog pens, and other inclosures whatever within
the main streets of Lexington" must remove them within sixty days. R. WADE,
Tim UnBA Fnornmm 83 (1959).
IIIThe recent cases involving the constitutionality of an amortization
ordinance are summarized and a new legislative scheme based on balancing the
irrecoverable costs against the noxiousness of the uses is proposed in Graham,
Legislative Techniques for the Amortization of the Nonconforming Use: A Sug-
gested Formula, 12 WAE L. REv. 435 (1966). Considerable doubts about the
traditional constitutional rationale are raised by Professor Michaelman's recent
foray into the morass of the police power versus taking dichotomy. See Michaelman,
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compen-
sation Law, 80 HAv. L. BEv. 1165 (1967).
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A word should be said about Section 100.365, which appears
at the end of the Chapter, but has nothing to do with a compre-
hensive reform of a state enabling statute. Rather, it is an affirma-
tion that Kentucky has not lost the spirit of Daniel Boone. The
Section prevents a planning unit from declaring that a non-
commercial dog kennel1 2 is a nonconforming use when operated
adjacent to a lot occupied by its owner or his tenant. This is a
clear example of special interest legislation. More importantly, it
involves the General Assembly in precisely the kinds of questions
which the rest of the Chapter delegates to local units of govern-
ment. It is the function of the cities and counties, not the General
Assembly, to decide which uses are compatible and incompatible.
Presumably a noncommercial dog kennel can still be enjoined as
a nuisance although Section 100.365 would require a court to rule
that it is not a nuisance per se.
The vagueness of the statutory standards will make it dif-
ficult for owners of a lawful nonconforming use to decide if an
expansion or change of use will be permitted. The problem will
be confounded if, as frequently happens, several public officials
give inconsistent answers. Ashland Lumber Co. v. Williams"3
illustrates these hazards and clarifies the correct procedure for a
person seeking to expand a lawful nonconforming use. Defendant
owned a factory (which was lawful) and desired to erect another
building on the premises. He obtained assurances from the city
manager and attorney that his new building would be "a mere
continuation of the nonconforming use" and a building permit
was issued. When the building was ninety per cent completed,
adjoining land owners brought an action before the Board of
Adjustment to revoke the permit, which it did. The circuit court
and Court of Appeals affirmed. The defendant argued that the
Board had no jurisdiction to revoke the permit because they could
not issue one. The Court agreed but held it was irrelevant be-
cause the circuit court had jurisdiction over an independent
action brought by the neighbors to hold that the building was
in violation of the ordinance. Defendant then argued that he
112 A noncommercial dog kennel is defined as "a kennel, in at or adjoining
a private residence where hunting, or other dogs are kept for the hobby of the
householder in using them in hunting or practice tracking trials or for exhi-
biting them in dog shows or field or obedience trials or for guarding or protecting
the householder's property." Occasional sales are also permitted.
113 411 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1966).
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was entitled to rely on the city manager, attorney, and building
inspector but the Court held that neither of these parties had the
power to decide if the use was nonconforming. The Board of
Adjustment may determine if an applicant is entitled to a
variance or a conditional use permit, but the circuit court is the
body with the power to decide if the proposed change in permitted
nonconforming use will be lawful.
The defendant's next line of attack was an attempt to boot-
strap himself to "a vested" nonconforming use by arguing that
the city and the neighbors were estopped from bringing suit be-
cause of his good faith reliance on advice which subsequently
turned out to be bad. This is a severe problem for cities trying
to enforce the nonconforming use provisions of their ordinances.
The applicant obtains a building permit in violation of the
ordinance and then cries "vested right" when the city tries to en-
join the use of the completed structure. The Court rejected these
arguments saying that "[i]f an inspector issues a permit for a use
which violates the zoning regulations the permit is no protection
and its issuance does not estop the city from enforcing the regula-
tions."114 The Court also tightened the definition of good faith
reliance, saying that "[t]he argument that the appellants acted in
good faith is not convincing since they choose to ignore the zoning
officials who did have authority in the matter, and instead de-
pended on two people with no authority in the matter... and one
person with mere ministerial functions, the building inspector."" 5
The opinion is an indication that the Court will now focus more
on defendant's knowledge and use of the applicable zoning pro-
cedure and less on the amount of expenditure in determining if
his right is "vested."" 6
VII. THE BOARD OF ADjusTMENT
The success or failure of a zoning ordinance to implement the
objectives of the community plan depends in part on the manner
in which it is administered by the board of adjustment. The
114 Id. at 910. The Court also held that the neighbors were not estopped
from bringing an independent action because it was not apparent in the early
stages of construction that a complete building was going up and the neighbors
organized a month after the court found defendant's plans became apparent.
15 Id.
116 Cf. Hobbs v. Markey, 398 S.W.2d 54 (Ky. 1966).
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board was originally conceived as a necessary safeguard to im-
munize the ordinance against attacks of unconstitutionality. 117
Its function was conceptualized as primarily judicial; it was to
grant variances from the application of the ordinance "where the
literal enforcement of the regulation [would] result in practical
difficulty or unnecessary hardship to the applicant .... " Legisla-
tures generally made the grant of a variance conditional on a
showing of unnecessary hardship. The courts, at least in theory,
have consistently emphasized that the applicant must prove that
the literal enforcement of the ordinance will impose a severe
hardship on the individual landowner because of the uniqueness
of his lot, rather than merely a decrease in maximum potential
profit from a projected use of his land. However, as Professor
Dukeminier's study of the Lexington Board of Adjustment 118
indicates, the old division between judicial and legislative func-
tions does not reflect the board's conception of their role. Instead
of merely adjudicating cases of severe hardship, boards tend to
grant variances on a simple showing of inconvenience to the in-
dividual lot owner. Board members are basically unconvinced
about the wisdom of strict enforcement of zoning ordinances.
This gives them considerable control over the implementation of
community plans which is often detrimental to the plan's in-
herent values.1 9 Chapter 100 retains the board of adjustment but
attempts to redraw the division between judicial and legislative
functions by defining the board's powers with more precision and
by imposing a more rigid procedure on its work.
1. Appointment of Members
Section 100.217 requires the appointment of a board of ad-
justment before a zoning regulation can be enforced. All mem-
bers of the board must be citizen members in line with Bassett's
warning "that local legislators should not be appointed."'20 In
the case of a joint unit, members are appointed by the mayor
and county judge, as provided in the agreement, subject to ap-
proval by their respective legislative bodies. An important in-
117E. BAss-rr, ZoNinG 123 (1940).
"8 Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study
in Misrule 50 Ky. L. J. 273 (1962).
119 Id. at 337-39.
120 KRS § 100.217(2). BAssinr, supra note 117, at 117.
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novation is that compensation is now authorized for members.
One of the chief criticisms has been that its members are too
closely tied to the local business community to impartially per-
form their functions. Section 100.217 (7) provides a means to make
them more independent. Kentucky might well follow the example
of Baltimore which paid its board members a salary equal to that
of a Supreme Court Justice at the time the board was estab-
lished.12
1
Section 100.223 allows the Board to employ planners or to
contract with other persons to carry out its assigned functions,
but the section does not make this mandatory. In practice, the
boards generally request the advice of the planning commission
staff although they are not noted for their reliance on it.
2. Powers of the Board
The board of adjustment has the power to grant two forms of
relief from the literal enforcement of the zoning ordinance. It
may grant a conditional use permit and subject it to reasonable
requirements if the use is authorized in the district by the zoning
ordinance. No showing of hardship is required. 22 It may grant a
dimensional variance which permits the lot owner to depart from
the requirements for the height or width of buildings and yard
sizes. A dimensional variance runs with the land. Section 100.251
provides that it may be transferred to a subsequent owner of the
land, but the holder cannot transfer it to another parcel of land.
Section 100.247 expressly prohibits the board from granting use
variances. A use variance is one which would allow a use not
permitted in the district by the ordinance. Kentucky cases were
once unclear on the power of the board to grant these types of
variances, but this ambiguity is now resolved.las A lot owner may
change his use only by obtaining a map amendment or by
121 H. Dr0roNs, LAND USE CONTROLS IN = UNITED STATES 58 (1962). This
suggestion is financially impractical for all planning units which do not encompass
a substantial metropolitan area. However, it does serve to indicate that it will
be necessary to pay for high quality zoning administration. Perhaps, the answer
for small cities and rural areas lies in the creation of regional or state-wide boards
of adjustment. This would permit appeals to be heard by full-time board members
assisted by a technical staff p
l2 Schmidt v. Craig, 354 S.W.2d 292 (Ky. 1962).12
3 Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning and Zoning Cominn of Paducah, 299
S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 195').
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obtaining a conditional use permit as authorized by the zoning
ordinance.
It is increasingly urged that the planning commission should
try to improve the quality of building design and site planning.
One technique for fostering greater quality control is to give the
planning commission the power to require a development plan
submitted by the lot owner as a condition precedent to granting
the conditional use permit or variance. This device gives the com-
mission a fulcrum with which to bargain with the builder for
design and site improvements. It would seem, however, that this
power is not available to the planning commission because the
Legislature has delegated to the board of adjustment the exclusive
power to require development plans except in the case of a map
amendment. Section 100.203 (2) allows the commission to re-
quire a development plan as a precondition to granting a map
amendment but does not expressly authorize it in other situations.
In Franklin County v. Webster,2. the Frankfort Planning and
Zoning Commission was authorized by the zoning ordinance to
allow specified institutional uses in residential districts by special
permit. The commission granted a permit for a nursing home
in a new subdivision. Construing Chapter 147, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the commission could not grant the permit be-
cause the Legislature had delegated to the board of adjustment
the exclusive authority to authorize uses by special permit. The
requirement that a development plan be approved by the plan-
ning commission as a precondition to the allowance of a use
authorized in the zoning ordinance should be construed as the
functional equivalent of allowing the use subject to obtaining a
special permit. In both instances, the planning unit must make
the decision that the use can only be integrated with the sur-
rounding uses if standards higher than those set by the uniform
terms of the ordinance are imposed. It is probable that the Court
of Appeals will apply Franklin County to Sections 100.203 and
.237, and hold that the power to require a development plan for
uses authorized in the ordinance has been delegated to the board
of adjustment rather than the planning commission.
Planners may decry this construction because it gives the
124 400 S.W.2d 693 (Ky. 1966).
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power to control design and site planning to the lay body which
has been historically the most unresponsive to professional advice.
They would prefer that this function be delegated to the planning
commission because it is more responsive to professional advice
and more experienced in applying planning considerations. This
would be a useful device in cases such as a petition by an educa-
tional or religious institution for a conditional use permit to
locate in a residential area. Some quality control is, of course,
now imposed by the zoning officer and the board of adjustment
but the chances are greater that the use can be made to harmonize
with surrounding uses if the power to require a development
plan for certain uses is also delegated to the planning commission.
The Board's function is tightly circumscribed by Section
100.243. A variance can only be granted if all of the following
findings are made:
(1) The specific conditions in detail which are unique to the
applicant's land and do not exist on other land in the
same zone.
(2) The manner in which the strict application of the pro-
visions of the regulation would deprive the applicant of
a reasonable use of the land in the manner equivalent to
the use permitted other landowners in the same zone.
(3) That the unique conditions and circumstances are not
the result of actions of the applicant taken subsequent
to the adoption of the zoning regulation.
Section 100.248 is designed to control the indiscriminate
granting of variances. It is unlikely that it will have a great deal of
influence because any decision can be packaged to meet the
statutory standards and thus be immunized from judicial review.
The standards set out in Section 100.248 can be used to frustrate
the property owner wishing to appeal an adverse decision unless
the court is willing to supervise the board's decision making pro-
cess. The first step is to insure that the applicant is told precisely
why the standards were applied to his property instead of handing
him a conclusionary statement that reveals little or nothing of the
board's reasoning. A recent Rhode Island decision, Coderre v.
Zoning Board of Review of Pawtucket,125 did this by reserving
the denial of a variance when the applicant received what the
125 230 A.2d 247 (R.I. 1967). Accord, Blair v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, City
of Chicago, 84 IM. App. 2d 159, 228 N.E.2d 555 (1967).
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court described as an all-purpose, fill-in-the-blank form, reasoning
that the applicant had a right to factual rather than conclusionary
findings. The Court of Appeals should reach the same decision.
The board's power to grant conditional use permits is ex-
tensive and gives it a fulcrum to bargain with a landowner for
favorable concessions in return for the issuance of a permit. No
finding of hardship must be made. The board may approve a per-
mit subject to compliance with conditions it is empowered to im-
pose. Section 100.237 (1) provides that "it may attach necessary
conditions such as time limitations, requirements that one or more
things be done before the request can be initiated, or conditions
of a continuing nature." The phrase "time limitation" is ambi-
guous because it can either refer to the duration of the permit or
to the time in which it must be exercised. Section 100.237 (3)
indicates that it includes at least a time during which the permit
must be exercised, and the Court could construe this to be the
definition of "time limitations."
The permit holder must exercise his permit within one year
after its issuance or the property will revert to its original designa-
tion, although two safeguards are provided for the permit holder.
The board must hold a public hearing before the permit can re-
vert and a liberal definition of "exercised" has been provided.
The board may revoke a permit after it has been exercised if the
holder fails to comply with its conditions. The administrative
officer is required to inspect the property at least once a year to
determine if there is compliance with the permit. If he believes
the property owner is not complying, the officer must submit a re-
port of his findings to the board. The board must then furnish
the property owner with a copy of the report and hold a hearing.
The board has the discretion to revoke the permit if they find no
steps have been taken to comply with the conditions between the
date of the report and the hearing. The board has the power to
compel the property owner to bear the cost of removing the
offending structures. The board "may impose any reasonable
conditions or restrictions" on any variance it decides to grant.
Section 100.237, which is titled Conditional Use Permits, slips in
the authority to revoke a variance for noncompliance with condi-
tions imposed by the board.
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VIII. SUBDIVISION REGULATION
1. Definition of Subdivision
The new enabling legislation contains expanded provisions
for subdivision regulation. Section 100.273 provides: "Any plan-
ning commission which has completed the objectives, land use
plan, transportation plan, and community facilities elements of a
comprehensive plan may adopt regulations for the subdivision of
land within its boundaries." The power to approve the sub-
division regulations has been delegated under Section 100.281 (1)
to the planning commission, which, in turn may delegate to its
secretary, or any other officer or employee, the authority to ap-
prove plans in accordance with the commission's adopted re-
quirements. The first major change in the subdivision regulation
is in the definition of a subdivision. Section 100.111 (22) defines
subdivision as:
the division of a parcel of land into two or more lots or tracts
for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale, lease,
or building development, or if a new street is involved, any
division of a parcel of land. An exception is that a division of
land for agricultural purposes into lots of five acres or more
not involving a new street shall not be deemed a sub-
division. 120 The term includes re-subdivision and when ap-
propriate to the context, shall relate to the process of sub-
division or land subdivided.
Under the previous enabling legislation, the subdivision
regulations were frequently avoided by leasing, rather than
selling, the land. The new definition closes that loophole, but it
will cause a host of new problems and will be difficult to ad-
minister. For example, the rental of a room over a detached
garage could qualify as a subdivision and a plat would be re-
quired. This technical reading of the definition serves no useful
planning purpose, and thus the definition will have to be ad-
ministered so that an unnecessary hardship will not be imposed
on those whose expanded use of land does not alter the existing
use and movement systems in the area or require additional
municipal services.
12 8The previous enabling legislation contained no exemption for agricultural
land. See Note, City Planning, Subdivision Control: What is a Subdivision?, 48
Ky. L. J. 253, 258-59 (1960).
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2. Approval of Plat as a Precondition to Recording
Section 100.277 (1) requires that no person or his agent shall
subdivide land without having obtained final approval of the
plat from the planning commission and without having recorded
it. This requirement is enforced by providing that no plat of a
subdivision of land within the planning unit jurisdiction may be
recorded by the county clerk until commission approval has been
obtained. Section 100.277 (2) provides that any instrument of
transfer, sale, or contract made with reference to a subdivision
plat which has not received commission approval shall be void.
However, it then provides that "all rights of such purchaser to
damages are hereby preserved." The wording of the statute and
the remedy provided for the purchaser are inconsistent. As a
matter of traditional remedies law, a void contract is one which
technically has never been executed and, therefore, neither party
is entitled to specific performance or damages. But Section
100.272 (2) apparently attempts to provide that the subdivision
regulations are meant only to force the developer to comply with
them and are not intended to deprive an innocent purchaser of
an action for damages. Thus, from a conceptual point of view,
the statute should be read to mean that transfer is voidable at the
option of the innocent third party, but his remedy is restricted
to damages for breach of a land sale contract. He may not, there-
fore, obtain specific performance. This would be consistent with
Section 100.291 which gives the planning commission the right
to seek an injunction against any developer or subsequent trans-
feree who seeks to build in violation of the subdivision regula-
tions. The denial of specific performance to the innocent vendee
is necessary to ensure that subsequent purchasers and the other
residents in the tract will not be burdened by the results of an
illegally constructed subdivision; however, no purpose is served
by denying damages to innocent third party purchasers.12z The
diligent practitioner who skips to the sections dealing with the
official map act will eventually find Section 100.341 which deals
with the transfer of lands in violation of the subdivision regula-
tions, which violation is not discovered in time to be enjoined
under Section 100.291. Under Section 100.341 the new owner
3
2 7 Cf. Munns v. Stenman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 543, 315 P.2d 67 (1957);
Popular Refreshments, Inc. v. Fuller's Milk Bar, 205 A.2d 445 (N.J. 1964).
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must file a plat and "the land shall be governed by the subdivision
regulations both prior to and after the platting of the land . . .
as if the plat had been filed in accordance with the provisions of
this chapter pertaining to subdivision regulations."
Section 100.281 gives discretion to the planning commission
to formulate a review and approval procedure for subdivision
plats. Most subdivision regulations provide for the filing of a
preliminary plat and after the developer and the commission
have negotiated proposed modifications, a final plat is to be sub-
mitted. The commission must approve all plats, either preliminary
or final, within ninety days after submission. It has been held in
other jurisdictions that a failure to disapprove within the specified
time limit results in an automatic approval 128 unless, of course,
the developer consents to an extension of time. The same result
should be reached in Kentucky. Sections 100.283 and .344 require
that all final plats approved by the planning commission must be
recorded at the expense of the applicant in the office of the clerk
of the county court.
3. Dedication and Reservation Powers Granted to Planning
Commissions
The enabling legislation contains no statement of the purpose
of subdivision regulation as does Wisconsin's, which provides that
the intent of the legislation is to promote the "orderly layout
and use of land, to prevent the overcrowding of land, to avoid
the undue concentration of population, to facilitate adequate
provision for transportation, water, sewage, schools, parks, play-
grounds and other public requirements...."1' Section 100.281 (3)
merely specifies that for all forms of land use the planning com-
mission may provide "requirements for the design of streets,
blocks, lots, utilities, recreation areas, other facilities, hazardous
areas, and areas subject to flooding." Section 100.281 (4) provides
that the planning commission may require that the developer
either install or dedicate as conditions precedent to approval of
any plat, "streets, utilities, and other facilities. . . ." Section
100.281 (5) states that "[t]he planning commission may require a
128 See Board of Selectmen of Pembroke v. R. and P. Realty Co., 348 Mass.
120, 202 N.E.2d 409 (1964).
129 WVIs. STAT. ANN. § 236.45(1) (1957).
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reservation not to exceed two years, for parks, open space, school
and other public uses" as a condition precedent to approval of
subdivision plats.
A major problem faced by rapidly growing areas is the pro-
vision of land for public facilities in the face of spiraling costs.
Cities have been reluctant or financially unable to purchase land
in advance of their needs while legislatures and courts have been
hesitant to allow excess condemnation. Cities use two principal
techniques to hold down future acquisition costs. The city may
require a dedication of land from a subdivider for public purposes
such as school and recreation facilities. The beauty of the com-
pulsory dedication is that the entire cost of the land for the public
facility can be shifted to the residents of the new subdivision. The
city may also require the subdivider to reserve land for a period
of years for public improvements. The reservation power has
been historically limited to public street extensions, but in re-
cent years it has been applied to school and park sites. When land
is reserved, the city is, in effect, given an option to purchase it
within a specified period at its value as unimproved land at the
date of purchase. Some states have tried to freeze the value at the
date of designation, but this has been held unconstitutional.1 30
Thus, the city cannot totally freeze land values under the reserva-
tion power but it can insure that the purchase price or condemna-
tion award does not reflect the value of improvements which
might have been made during the period between designation
and purchase. The owner may still receive the increment re-
presenting the natural increase in the value of his land for its use
at the time the reservation was created. Both of these techniques
are authorized by Section 100.281 and .293-.317, although their
scope remains unclear and substantial constitutional questions
remain.
Sections 100.284 (4) and (5) raise two important construction
problems and a major constitutional question: (1) is the power
to compel dedications restricted to property which falls within
subsection (4); (2) are the dedication and reservation powers
exclusive or complementary; and, (3) are compulsory dedications
and reservations a taking of private property without due process
of law. It appears that the Legislature, unable to make up its
130 State ex rel. Wiley v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960).
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mind about the scope of compulsory dedication, chose to cloud
the issue. A New Jersey court, construing a similar statute, held
that the legislature had established two mutually exclusive
schemes for the provision of subdivision improvements.' 3 ' The
court reasoned that the power to compel dedication was restricted
to improvements necessary to provide access and services to the
buildings constructed in the subdivisions. Parks and schools could
only be acquired by reservation. The court reached its result by
a familiar application of ejusdem generis. This result will prob-
ably be applied to subsections (4) and (5), although not neces-
sarily. The words "and other facilities," in subsection (4) could
be construed to include schools and parks. In Jordan v. Village of
Menomonee Falls,132 the Wisconsin court allowed compulsory
dedications for school and park sites even though they were not
expressly authorized in the statute. The court reasoned that the
broad statement of intent meant that the legislature wanted the
statute broadly construed and thus ejusdem generis was not ap-
plicable. The absence of a general statement of intent would be
a reason for not following Jordan in Kentucky. The option is
open to the Court of Appeals, however, if they want to give
maximum powers to cities and counties. But the problem is
really one for the Legislature. They must decide if cities and
counties should be given the maximum constitutional power to
control land use. There is no reason why local units should be
precluded from using available techniques. The problems of
abuse are great when compulsory dedications are required, but
the answer lies with the courts and the legislatures. These bodies
should set more precise standards for their exercise instead of
prohibiting their use as appears to be the case with compulsory
dedications for school and park purposes.
Compulsory dedications fall into two categories: (1) improve-
ments made necessary by the subdivision, and (2) improvements
designed to shift part of the cost of enlarging existing public
facilities, generated by the subdivision, from the general public to
the residents of the new area. These include payments for larger
drainage systems and land or fees for school and recreation sites.
Courts have found no constitutional problems with the first
131 West Park Ave., Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1
(1966).
13228 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
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category.133 The rationale has been that these are analogous to
special assessments. The city has the choice of either installing the
facilities and financing them through a special assessment, or re-
quiring the developer to install them, allowing him to recoup
from the residents through increased property price. Thus, there
will be no constitutional problems with most of the dedications
which will be required under Section 100.281 (4).
It has been urged that the special assessment analogy defines
the constitutional limits of the power to compel dedications,
134
but not all courts have accepted this argument. 13 The cases
extending the dedication power have viewed it as simply another
aspect of the police power, and focus on the benefit to both the
individual lot owner and the general community. From this
perspective, dedications which benefit both the lot owner and
the community are not categorically unconstitutional. Heymen
and Gilhool argue correctly that exactions such as school and
park sites are not unconstitutional as long as the amount of the
exactions is related to the increased municipal costs generated by
the development.136 They further suggest that cost-accounting
techniques can be used to determine accurately the capital costs
generated by subdivision development. 137 The most recent cases
which have considered the problem have sustained compulsory
dedications of school and park facilities or lieu fees on the ground
that the exactions were reasonably related to the community costs
generated by the subdivision.138 The General Assembly has failed
to grant local planning units the full scope of constitutional
devices available to control the development of new land. This
deficiency should be corrected by amending Section 100.281 to
expressly permit the dedication of school and park sites.
More substantial constitutional questions remain with the
'33 See Johnson, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The
Quest for a Rationale, 52 CoRNEmL L. Q. 871, 888-903 (1967).
134 Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivison, 14 SYRAcusE L. REV.
405, 407 - 08 (1963).
'35 See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 38 Misc. 2d 658. 238 N.Y.S.2d
156 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608,
137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
136 Heyman & Gilbool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Com-
munity Costs on New Subdivision Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73
YALE L. J. 1119 (1964).
137 Id. at 1141 - 46.
13 8 See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 38 Misc. 2d 658, 238 N.Y.S.2d
156 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608,
137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
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use of the reservation power. In Miller v. City of Beaver Falls,3 9
the city enacted an ordinance requiring a three year reservation
of land for possible purchase as a park. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held the ordinance unconstitutional, reasoning in
part that the property owner was prohibited from developing his
land even though there was no certainty that the city would pur-
chase the property during the reservation period. Section 100.-
281 (5) does not contain a provision for a hardship variance and
thus will probably be held unconstitutional under Miller v.
Beaver. 40 The enabling legislation does provide another method
of reserving land for public facilities by the adoption of an
official map. The constitutionality of these reservations must be
evaluated in this context.
IX. THE OFFicIAL MAP
1. Map Authorized
Section 100.293 allows the preparation of an official map. This
device should be more widely used. The official map allows the
city to reserve land, in advance of its need, for streets and other
public facilities. It also allows the individual to proceed in re-
liance that a given course of government action will follow. The
official map has been historically used for street extensions, but
Section 100.297 (1) extends its use to "parks and playgrounds,
public schools and building sites, and other public facilities
needs," in addition to public streets and rights of way. The map
cannot be prepared until all of the required components of the
139 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
140 The court could, however, find that the two year period is "reasonable"
and thus uphold the constitutionality of the reservation. In Metro Realty Co. v.
County of El Drad, 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 35 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1963), the court
upheld a three year interim zoning ordinance which was designed to limit
development around a potential U.S. Bureau of Reclamation reservoir site. The
court found that the ordinance was reasonable because "no evidence in this
case points to any loss impelling us to hold that the limits of the police power
have been exceeded." There was no loss, so the court argued, because the
announcement of the project, rather than the ordinance, caused the alleged drop
in resource acquisition rather than regulation. See Sax, Takings and the Police
Compare State ex rel. Mumma v. Stanley, 5 Ohio App. 191, 214 N.E.2d 684
(1966) (ordinance which forbade the issuance of building permits in an area
which might be included in an urban renewal project was unconstitutional).
Professor Sax argues that Miller should be followed because the city is engaged
in resource acquistion rather than regulation. See Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 73 (1964).
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comprehensive plan have been prepared and a public facilities
improvement program adopted.
After these have been completed, the planning unit prepares
an official map which may designate "the location and extent of
existing and proposed public streets, including rights of way,
water courses, parks and playgrounds, public schools and build-
ing sites, and other public facilities needs." Thus, the enabling
legislation goes far beyond most official mapping statutes. The
passage of the ordinance does not obligate the city to open a street
or purchase a facility,141 but no structure may be built within the
lines of a designated street or public facility unless a building
permit from the enforcement officer is obtained.142 If the permit
is denied "no person shall recover any damages for the taking for
public use of any structure or improvement constructed within
the lines shown on the map" and may be compelled to remove the
offending structure at his own expense.
A public hearing, with notice, pursuant to KRS Chapter 424
is required prior to the adoption of the official map and for
subsequent amendments. However, public facilities "which have
been approved under subdivision regulations provided in this
chapter" may be posted on the official map without a public hear-
ing. This presumably means facilities located within the bound-
aries of a subdivision plat approved by the planning unit and that
a public hearing is still required for the mapping of land out-
side a subdivision. 43
2. Constitutionality
Section 100.307 provides the traditional saving clause to im-
munize the official map against claims of unconstitutionality. The
owner who is denied a building permit may appeal to the board
of adjustments for a permit "if the land shown on the official
map is not yielding a fair return. . . ." The board is directed to
grant a permit for a building "which will, as little as practicable,
increase the cost of future acquisition" and it may impose
"reasonable requirements as a condition of granting such per-
141IG § 100.801 (1968).
142 KRS § 100.303 (1966).
' 4 3 See Kurcirek & Beuscher, Wisconsin s Official Map Law: Its Current
Popularity and Implications for Conveyancng an Platting, 1957 Wis. L. REiv.
176, 188.
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mits." The permit shall not be granted if "the applicant will not
be substantially damaged by placing his building outside the
boundary lines of the proposed facility." The section is typical of
official map saving clauses and does little to clarify the standards
that the board of adjustments must follow. In the first sentence
the board is directed to look at only the mapped portion of the
land to determine if denial of the permit will not yield fair re-
turn, while the last sentence indicates that the proper frame of
reference is the tract as a whole. The confusion stems from Bas-
sett and Williams's rejection of the tract as a whole as a proper
standard. 44 The focus on the portion of the tract within the map
was added because of substantial doubts about the constitution-
ality of the official map and this standard was thought to be the
least objectionable. These constitutional doubts do not exist to-
day.145 Thus, the Court of Appeals should interpret Section
100.307 to require a permit only where the tract as a whole is not
yielding a fair return.
The official map's attempt to reduce the risk of the public's
failure to purchase the property disturbed the court in Miller v.
City of Beaver Falls. 46 If the planning unit wants to adopt the
official map, it must adopt a program. Section 100.317 provides
that no public facilities may be placed on the map unless they are
included in the short term capital improvements budget. The
short range capital improvement program projects needs and
costs over a five or six year period, but the first year of the short
term capital improvements budget must automatically become
part of the city or county's current operating budget. Section
100.311 does not appear to obligate the city or county to purchase
the property because "for purpose of year to year budget revision
and updating, the long term capital improvements program may
be reviewed and revised at any time in keeping with the review
and revision of the comprehensive community development
plans."
The Court has three models to choose from in deciding the
constitutionality of the official map sections. It could follow the
cases upholding the constitutionality of official street maps or it
could follow those holding that a zoning ordinance can not be
144 Id. at 198.
145 Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936); State
ex rel. Miller v. Manders, 2 Wis. 2d 365, 86 N.W. 2d 469 (1957).
146368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951).
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used to prevent interim development, thus reducing future
acquisition costs. 147 The first analogy should be followed, how-
ever, since discriminatory treatment of the individual property
owner which characterizes the zoning cases is, in theory, absent
because Section 100.307 requires that a permit be granted if the
land shown on the official map is not yielding a fair return.14 s A
third alternative is also open to the Court. Note (1) 90, the
severance provision of Chapter 100, could be used to uphold the
provisions for the mapping of streets and rights of way while
holding the power to reserve other public facilities unconstitu-
tional.
Even if the Court of Appeals upholds the constitutionality of
the official map, it will not be very effective to reserve land for
public facilities such as schools and parks. If the area surrounding
the reservation develops faster than the city or county's acquisi-
tion program, an excellent case for a variance will be made since
it can be shown that the vacant land cannot be put to reasonably
profitable use compared to the surrounding property. The map
will succeed in reserving land only in outlying undeveloped areas
where the land would probably still be vacant, regardless of the
map, when the city decided to purchase it. The map may have
the effect of forcing the city or county to become more farsighted
in the acquisition of land for public facilities, but this is not
likely to occur in most cities or counties. A new technique is
needed to reserve land for public facilities. The Legislature
should consider a system which combines the hardship permit
with compulsory purchase.14 9 An example of this system would
be to allow any owner who was restricted by the reservation to
serve a notice to purchase on the city or county. The govern-
mental unit would have a period of time to make the decision to
purchase and if they chose not to, then issuance of a permit would
be mandatory. One such scheme is discussed below in connection
with Section 100.287.
147 See, e.g., Wital Corp. v. Township of Denville, 93 N.J. Sup. 107, 225
A.2d 139 (1966); and cases cited in Mandelker, Planning the Freeway: Interim
Controls or Highway Programs, 1964 D=un L. J. 439, n.54.
14 8 See Mandelker, supra note 147, at 455-58.
149 See generally Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in
Metropolitan Areas, 110 PA. L. REv. 179 (1961); Mandelker, supra note 147,
at 472-76.
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3. Coordination of Subdivision Development and Highway
Location
A major land use problem of recent vintage has been the
spread of the superhighway across the countryside. There has
been little coordination between subdivision development and
the timing of route selection and construction. This forces the
state to condemn recently developed land and this, in turn, in-
creases the cost of highway construction. Section 100.287 attempts
to provide a procedure for the voluntary coordination of sub-
division development and the construction of state highways by
granting each planning unit subdivision controls. The state
Department of Highways may file a map of land within one mile
on either or both sides of a proposed highway. After this is re-
ceived, no preliminary plats may be approved until one copy has
been sent to the Highway Department for review. The Depart-
ment has no power to compel the planning unit to reject or
modify the plat but may communicate its recommendations with-
in fifteen days after its receipt.
The statute is a helpful but timid step toward meeting the
problem. The state should consider adopting a statute drafted by
Professor Mandelker for the protection of future highway right
of ways.1' 0 This proposal blends American and English land use
control techniques and grants the state highway commission
power to designate highway control zones. The commission re-
tains the power to control development in these zones, although
it may delegate this function to local planning units if the state
considers their land use control program adequate. Within the
highway control zone, development is prohibited except by
special permit. The commission may either prohibit or condition
development depending on its impact upon the proposed high-
way. The English technique of compulsory purchase has been
adapted to give hardship relief, thus alleviating the major con-
stitutional objections of such a statute. Three forms of relief are
authorized: (1) the highway commission may purchase the prop-
erty if certain hardship conditions are found to exist; (2) it may
allow the development or amend its original conditions; (3) it
15o See D. MADELKME, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENvnRmo m r 869-75 (1966)
(A proposed act for the protection of future highway rights of way).
1968]
KENurcKy LAW JouRALV
may acquire a negative easement in the development of the prop-
erty by awarding the property owner interest until the time when
the property is purchased for highway purposes.
The subdivider will generally seek to enhance the value of
his development through the use of restrictive covenants. As the
subdivision ages, problems between the restrictions imposed in
the covenants and inconsistent zoning ordinances may arise.
Section 100.349 codifies the common law rule that in case of
such a conflict the covenant controls if it imposes a higher
standard than the zoning ordinance. 151 The restrictions can be
removed only through an application of the doctrine of changed
conditions.152 The zoning ordinance is not irrelevant, for the
Court of Appeals has indicated that the ordinance is evidence
that the conditions have, in fact, substantially changed since the
restrictions were imposed. 5 3 However, this fact alone will not
meet the burden of proof imposed on the party trying to invoke
the doctrine.
X. APPEAMs TO CIRCUIT COURT
1. Appeals Authorized From Final Action
The legislation provides a uniform procedure for appeals to
the circuit court. The previous enabling legislation ran the
gambit from a trial de novo in Louisville and Jefferson County
to the absence of a procedure outlining how an appeal should be
taken in cities of the third through sixth class and counties
containing them. 54 Section 100.347 provides that "[alny person
claiming to be injured or aggrieved by any final action of the
planning commission or boards of adjustment" may appeal to the
circuit court of the county in which the land lies thirty days after
any final action of the commission or board. The requirement of
a final action is a codification of the principle that the litigant
must exhaust his administrative remedies before he is eligible for
151 Osborner v. Hewitt, 855 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1960).
152 See, e.g., Fortner v. Gulf Refining Co., 316 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1958).
15 3 Annes v. Freeman, 294 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1956).
154The Court of Appeals declared the trial de novo unconstitutional in
1964. American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning
and Zoning Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 194). See generally LEGisLATw
REsEI ICH COMM'N, RESEARCH REPORT 11, PLANNIG ANm ZoNING IN KmTrucY
34-35 (1962).
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judicial relief. 55 The legislation does not attempt to define final
action but, obviously, it means that the issue must have been
considered and decided by the body with the power to implement
its decision.156 This is made clear by Section 100.347 (1) which
specifies that "[flinal action shall not include the commission's
recommendations to other governmental bodies." For example, in
the case of a map amendment, a final action results only after the
city approves or disapproves the commission's recommendation.
2. Final Action Defined
A final action is determined both by Chapter 100 and local
procedure. The legislation provides only that the issue be taken
to the body with the power to decide and implement its decision.
This merely defines the level to which an appeal must be taken
before a final action can be obtained; it does not inform the
litigant which decisions of the various bodies will be considered
final. This is to be determined by the procedures and practices of
the appropriate local ordinance and body. A good example of
this can be found in a recent Kansas case, Arkenberg v. City of
Topeka.157 In October, 1964, plaintiff church requested a map
amendment to construct a low income housing project. The
planning commission disapproved the request and in December,
1964, forwarded its recommendation to the city commission which
referred the application back to the planning commission for
further study in January, 1965. In March, the Church amended
its petition and both the planning commission and the city sub-
sequently approved. The residents of the neighborhood carried
their appeal to the courts and argued that the city approval was
invalid because the local ordinance forbade the filing of more
than one zoning application within one year following a previous
application for the same plot. The court rejected this argument
on the ground that no final action had been taken because "the
ordinance contemplates a finality of action by the governing body
... the immediate return of the application for reconsideration of
155 Kentucky recognizes the major exceptions to the exhaustion requirement.
There is no need to exhaust if the administrative remedy is inadequate or the
statute as a whole is alleged to be unconstitutional. Louisville and Jefferson
County Planning and Zoning Comm'n v. Stocker, 259 S.W.2d 443 (Ky. 1953);
Goodwin v. City of Louisville, 309 Ky. 11, 215 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. 1948).
156 See Thomas v. Barnett 297 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1966).
'57 421 P.2d 213 (Kan. 1966).
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the new design did not constitute denial of the application but it
remained in the process of consideration, and until the city com-
mission either accepted or denied the application there was no
final action as contemplated by the ordinance."' 58
The following briefly summarizes the levels required to ob-
tain a final action for the various types of relief permitted in
Chapter 100 and the time permitted if different from Section
100.347:
A. Map Amendment: The planning commission's opinion must
be obtained and the city legislative body or the fiscal court must
have approved or disapproved the recommendation;
B. Approval or Denial of a Subdivision Plat: The request must
be referred to the planning commission which will usually dele-
gate the initial consideration to a subcommittee and the com-
mission staff as authorized in Section 100.281 (20). The planning
commission has the final power to approve or disapprove the
plat;
C. Adoption of Official Map: The procedure is the same as for a
map amendment;
D. Amendment of the Official Map: The procedure is the same
as for a map amendment;
E. Conditional Use Permit: The board of adjustment has the
power to hear and decide applications; 15 9
F. Dimensional Variance: The procedure is the same as for a
conditional use permit;
158 Id. at 217.
159 In the case of the board of adjustments, it is difficult to say whether an
action is final at the time when the board actually votes on the matter, when
this information is transmitted officially to the enforcement official, or when the
minutes of the meeting are officially approved. An official record of the minutes
of each meeting should be maintained by the secretary of the board, and it
would not be wise to consider any action as being final until the official record
is prepared. There is too much opportunity for confusion and error during the
course of a board meeting since they are often informal. The official minute re-
cord may not be approved until the next meeting, so that a period of thirty to
sixty days may elapse between the time of the action and the time of minute
approval. The most logical act which could be considered a final action by the
board would be the transmittal to the enforcement officer of a notice of the
action of the board. This will generally be prepared by the secretary after the
minutes of the board meeting have been reviewed, thus minimizing any chance
of error. Since the enforcement official acts in accordance with this notice,
this would seem to be the point in time when the action of the board would
become final. Only on rare occasions are there corrections required in properly
prepared minutes, and these are generally of a minor nature and do not sub-
stantially affect the action taken by the enforcement official. It is suggested,
however, that minutes should be carefully prepared, and that, if possible, a
tape recorder be used.
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G. Denial of a Building Permit Because the Proposed Construc-
tion is not in Conformity With the Literal Terms of the Zoning
Ordinance: The board of adjustment has the power under
Section 100.257 to hear and decide these cases.160 The applicant
has sixty days to appeal after the decision is rendered. The statute
does specify the event which starts the running of the sixty day
period. Section 100.261, which deals with appeals by aggrieved
parties, provides that the appeal must be taken after the party or
his agent receives notice of the action. It is assumed that the
General Assembly meant that an appeal under Section 100.257
must be taken within sixty days after notice of the adverse
decision. Otherwise the applicant would be denied procedural due
process. An appeal by an aggrieved non-applicant must be taken
within thirty days after receipt of notice of the decision.'6 '
XI. CONCLUSION
This paper has attempted to examine one aspect of the
decision making structure designed to control the development
of land. Chapter 100 is a vast improvement over the previous
legislation, but it should not be viewed as the total solution to the
many land development problems Kentucky is facing and will
face in the near future. It must be viewed in the context of other
statutory systems which affect the physical environment. A recent
study conducted by students at the University of Kentucky Col-
lege of Law indicates that the annexation laws have failed to
facilitate the functional consolidation of metropolitan Lexington
and thus are in need of comprehensive reform. It is hoped that
the revision of Chapter 100 will be the first in a series of badly
needed reforms of many areas of Kentucky local government law.
Little effort has been made to explore the consequences of the
fragmentation of power between different governmental units.
The revision of Chapter 100 does not radically alter existing
160 Section 100.271 permits the city or county to designate an adminis-
trative official, usually the building inspector, to administer the ordinance. The
official is directed to issue a building permit only if the proposed construction is
in conformity with the "literal" term of the zoning regulation.
161 If no building permit is issued and the builder commences or continues
to build, a restraining order may be obtained and lack of a building permit will
constitute a prima facie case for its issuance. The section does not specify who
shall obtain the order but presumably it will be the zoning officer as provided in
Section 100.271.
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distributions of power. These divisions should not, lowever, be
viewed as permanent, and increasing attention must be given to
new structures and allocations of power. There will be increasing
pressures to do so as federal and state programs and grants be-
come more and more conditioned on regional approaches com-
mon to several jurisdictions. This may require the consolidation
of the power to plan, acquire land, and implement a land use
control system into new institutions structured to solve regional
problems. Such a radical restructuring is not visionary, for ex-
ample; it is essential if Kentucky is to solve the problems of
economic stagnation which plague many parts of the state. The
Corps of Engineers has recently announced that it will not con-
tinue to build multipurpose reservoirs in Eastern Kentucky
authorized under the elastic definition of expansion benefits
authorized under the Appalachian Regional Development Act
unless the state formulates a program to develop the land which
will be freed from floods. It is unrealistic to expect rural cities
and counties to cope with the problems such a program will
generate. Thus, it will be necessary for the state to create new
institutions which can plan and implement a comprehensive land
development program.
A recent historical study of Kentucky, Dr. Thomas D. Clark's
Kentucky: Land of Contrasts, points out that Kentucky is losing
whatever individuality it once had and is falling into the mold
of national mediocrity. A drive around Louisville indicates the
truth of this thesis. One can risk one's life making a left hand
turn to eat the same tasteless pizza obtainable in Chicago or Los
Angeles. However, Kentucky now has adequate enabling legisla-
tion to cope with many of the pressing problems of land develop-
ment. Its success, like that of any other statute, will depend on
the manner it functions to rationalize the decision making process.
At this point, one can hope it will be administered to accomplish
this end.'6
162 Planning units have until June 16, 1971, to begin operations under the
new statute, KRS 100.397 (1966), and thus many of the dinkis can be ironed out
before it becomes uniformly applicable. Several amendments were proposed
during the 1968 session of the General Assembly. An article in the fourth issue
of the Kentucky Law Journal will discuss the changes made during this session.
